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This research explored the strategy behind Iran’s English-language media campaigns on 
the Internet, particularly with regard to Iran’s use of social media, to determine its 
possible impact on homeland security in the United States. A qualitative analysis of data 
from the Facebook pages of Iran’s PressTV and the Young Journalists Club was 
conducted, and the author determined that the best method to determine Iran’s messaging 
strategy would be to closely follow the statements made by Iran’s Supreme Leader. The 
study also found rumors and conspiracy theories contributed to a large part of the Iranian 
social media message, and there was a significant connection to Western websites that 
featured conspiracy theory content.  
Although the Iranian Facebook message has only achieved modest inroads, its 
connection to conspiracy theories is troubling. As Daniel Jolley and Karen M. Douglas 
point out in their 2014 article, “The Social Consequences of Conspiracism,” conspiracy 
theories increase distrust in the government and inhibit future political involvement. 
Conspiracy theories and rumors can also be used in disinformation campaigns, and the 
1968 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders linked the spread 
of rumors to civil unrest. Rather than ceding a portion of the Internet to Iran’s 
messengers, this study recommends an American counter-messaging strategy and the use 
of technological advances to defeat Iran’s Internet censorship in order to give all Iranians 
unfettered access to Western media sources. 
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Our world is becoming more interconnected, and a principal force driving this change is 
the Internet. Messages can travel faster than ever to an ever-growing portion of the globe. 
The Internet also provides new opportunities for nation states, as well as for formerly 
disenfranchised smaller actors, to spread their messages worldwide. In much of the 
Western world, that message arrives uncensored. In other regions of the world, 
censorship and control of Internet access presents challenges, but none that have yet 
proven insurmountable.   
One of the most important messaging tools associated with the Internet is social 
media. The Arab Spring provides us with one example of social media’s power to 
reshape our world. The use of the Internet and social media by terrorist organizations for 
worldwide radicalization, recruitment and the spread of propaganda reveals a darker side 
to the changes wrought by the information age.   
Iranian media outlets are now using social media to share their government’s 
viewpoint with the rest of the world. The Iranian message is available in English, and it 
has been placed on social media sites throughout the Western world, including Facebook, 
the most popular social media site in the world.1 
This thesis explored the strategy behind Iran’s English-language media campaigns 
on the Internet, particularly with regard to Iran’s use of social media, in order to 
determine its possible impact on American homeland security. The research for this 
thesis was built around a qualitative analysis of the Facebook pages for Iranian news 
websites that are popular in the United States. That analysis focused on the pages for 
PressTV and the Young Journalists Club (YJC). An analysis of the data showed that the 
best method to determine Iran’s messaging strategy would simply be to closely follow the 
statements made by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.   
1 “Facebook.com Site Overview,” Alexa, accessed February 16, 2015, 
http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/facebook.com. 
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This study also found that rumors and conspiracy theories were a large part of the 
Iranian social media message and, particularly in the case of PressTV, there was a 
significant connection to Western websites that featured conspiracy theory content. The 
Iranian regime’s social media message has not been terribly effective, but it does possess 
some modest potential to do mischief by tapping into the conspiracy theory community 
or through the use of disinformation campaigns.  
Psychological studies indicate that conspiracy theories increase distrust in the 
government and have a negative effect on a person’s likelihood to vote in the future.2  
Conspiracy theories and rumors can also be used in disinformation campaigns that can 
tarnish a nation’s image worldwide. The former Soviet Union’s Operation INFEKTION 
was an example of a successful disinformation campaign that took advantage of the 
psychology behind rumor and conspiracy theories. Studies have also linked rumors, 
which are often used as a means to spread conspiracy theories, to civil unrest.3  The 
recent protests in Ferguson, Missouri, some of which were violent, took place in an 
environment fueled in part by rumors. It is the creation and manipulation of incendiary 
events such as these that could provide weapons for America’s enemies, foreign and 
domestic, to tear away at the fabric of our democracy.   
The Iranian message is hampered by its own censorship efforts. American 
engagement on social media sites, with counter-messaging emphasizing the fact that 
Iranian citizens cannot freely access the same social media channels that they are using to 
put out their message to the West, would likely be effective. Counter-messaging could 
also be crafted to illuminate the way Iran deals with dissenting views in its own country. 
Finally, advances in technology could be leveraged to defeat Iran’s Internet censorship, 
and all Iranians would then have unfettered access to Western media sources.   
2 Daniel Jolley and Karen M. Douglas, “The Social Consequences of Conspiracism: Exposure to 
Conspiracy Theories Decreases Intentions to Engage in Politics and to Reduce One’s Carbon Footprint,” 
British Journal of Psychology 105, no. 1 (2014): 35–56 
3 United States National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (NACCD) and Otto Kerner, Report 
of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, March 1, 1968 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1968. 
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Internet rumors and conspiracy theories represent a danger to American democracy. 
Analysts can assist our leaders by identifying and tracking potentially damaging rumors 
and conspiracy theories. Based on those efforts, it should be possible to craft counter-
messaging strategies. Some of these counter-messaging strategies might consist simply of 
efforts toward greater government transparency and toward recognizing the need to make 
facts and information available to the public. Government-led efforts to improve the 
American public’s critical thinking skills and to educate the public about the psychology 
of rumors and conspiracy theories might also be useful in reducing American 
vulnerability. 
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That is the beginning of knowledge—the discovery of something we do not 
understand. 
Frank Herbert, God Emperor of Dune1 
 
A. IN THE BEGINNING 
Whether we like it or not, our world is becoming more interconnected. One of the 
major forces driving this change is the Internet. Messages can travel faster than ever to an 
ever-growing portion of the globe. The Internet also provides new opportunities for 
nation states, as well as for formerly disenfranchised smaller actors, to spread their 
messages worldwide. In much of the Western world, that message arrives uncensored. In 
other regions of the world, censorship and control of Internet access presents challenges, 
but none that have yet proven insurmountable.   
One of the most important messaging tools associated with the Internet is social 
media. The “Arab Spring” provides us with one example of social media’s power to 
reshape our world.2  The use of the Internet and social media by terrorist organizations 
for worldwide radicalization, recruitment and the spread of propaganda reveals a darker 
side to the changes wrought by the information age. The Boston Marathon bombings 
provide a potent example of this dark side. Alleged bomber Dzhokar Tsarnaev told the 
authorities that he and his brother were inspired by and obtained logistical instructions for 
the Boston Marathon bombing attack from Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s online 
magazine.3  A recent report provides several more examples: 
1 “Frank Herbert Quotes,” Notable Quotes, accessed February 18, 2015, http://www.notable-
quotes.com/h/herbert_frank.html. 
2 “New Study Quantifies Use of Social Media in Arab Spring” UW Today, accessed October 27, 2013, 
http://www.washington.edu/news/2011/09/12/new-study-quantifies-use-of-social-media-in-arab-spring/. 
3 Anne Speckhard, “The Boston Marathon Bombers: The Lethal Cocktail That Turned Troubled Youth 
to Terrorism,” Perspectives on Terrorism 7, no. 3 (2013): 5, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/268. 
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Five young American students were arrested in Pakistan for attempting to 
join a terrorist group-they started their journey on YouTube. Some 
American jihadists like Zachary Chesser were inspired to set up their own 
jihadist website. Others like Samir Khan and Emerson Begolly exhorted 
others online to carry out terrorist attacks. Still others have found 
sufficient inspiration on the Internet to plot or carry out terrorist attacks in 
the United States like Michael Finton, who plotted to blow up a federal 
building in Illinois, or Major Nidal Hasan who killed 13 of his fellow 
soldiers and wounded 31 others at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009. Jose 
Pimentel apparently radicalized himself on the Internet, urged others to 
carry out attacks, then migrated from encourager to would-be bomber, 
following instructions from al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine to build his 
explosive devices.4 
The United States government has made efforts to deal with the threat presented 
by terrorist organizations’ media activities, including their activities on the Internet. 
Media arms for these organizations have been listed by the Treasury Department as 
Specially Designated Global Terrorist organizations.5  Examples of these organizations 
include Hezbollah’s al Manar television6 and Hamas’ Al-Aqsa Television.7  The State 
Department created the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications to 
challenge and counter al-Qaeda’s Internet messaging campaign.8  Legislative reform also 
challenged terrorist-recruiting efforts online. The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 
2012 allows for the dissemination of public diplomacy materials to the American 
audience.9  According to Congressmen Mac Thornberry (R-TX), one of the sponsors of 
the legislation, modernization became necessary to counter the influence of al Qaeda and 
4 Brian Michael Jenkins, Is Al Qaeda’s Internet Strategy Working?(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT371.pdf. 
5 “Terrorist, Regime, and Western Media: The War of Ideas in the Disinformation Age,” U.S. 
Department of State, December 11, 2013, http://www.state.gov/r/cscc/releases/218606.htm. 
6 “U.S. Designates Al-Manar as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity Television Station Is 
Arm of Hizballah Terrorist Network,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 23, 2006, 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/js4134.aspx. 
7 “Treasury Designates Gaza-Based Business, Television Station for Hamas Ties,” U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, March 18, 2010, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg594.aspx. 
8 “Terrorist, Regime, and Western Media.” 
9 John Hudson, “U.S. Repeals Propaganda Ban, Spreads Government-Made News to Americans,” 




                                                 
other violent extremists amongst disaffected populations, and to undercut these 
extremists’ recruitment abilities.10 Thornberry asserted that updating Smith-Mundt would 
“bolster our strategic communications and public diplomacy capacity on all fronts and 
mediums—especially online.”11  Thornberry also illustrated the need for this change 
using a 2009 incident in which the Smith-Mundt Act had prevented a Minneapolis-based 
radio station from replaying a Voice of America (VOA) piece that was meant to counter 
terrorist propaganda, even though that community had been the target of al Shabaab 
recruitment efforts.12 
Terrorist groups are not the only actors using social media to target Americans. 
Iran, an international rival, is now using social media to share its government’s viewpoint 
with the rest of the world. The Iranian message is available in English, and it has been 
placed on social media sites throughout the Western world, including Facebook, the most 
popular social media site in the world.13  In fact, Facebook is the second most popular 
website in the world, only lagging behind the search engine giant Google.    
This thesis was built around a qualitative analysis of the Facebook pages for 
Iranian news websites that are popular in the United States. That analysis focused on the 
pages for PressTV14 and the Young Journalists Club (YJC).15  PressTV was created by 
Islamic Republic Iran Broadcasting (IRIB).16  YJC’s English website’s “about” section is 
blank,17 but YJC’s Twitter page indicates that IRIB founded YJC in 2000.18  IRIB 




13 “How Popular is Facebook.com?” Alexa Internet, accessed January 14, 2015, 
http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/facebook.com.  
14 “Tehran, Iran - Media/News/Publishing- PressTV,” Facebook, accessed October 2, 2014. 
https://www.facebook.com/PRESSTV. 
15 “YJC.ir,” Facebook, accessed October 28, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club. 
16 “Media Environment Guide: Iran,” BBC Monitoring, July 30, 2009, 
http://www.combatfilms.com/mediaoperations/Media%20Environment%20Guide%20Iran.pdf. 
17 “YCJ.ir,” Young Journalists Club, accessed January 15, 2015, http://www.yjc.ir/en. 
18 “Journalists Club (@YJC_ir” Twitter, accessed January 15, 2015, https://twitter.com/YJC_ir. 
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controls both foreign and domestic Iranian broadcasts.19  It is state funded, and Iran’s 
Supreme Leader has the power to appoint or remove its director.20  According to Iran’s 
constitution, IRIB is supposed to “support the ideology and interests of the state.”21  This 
thesis also compares the Iranian social media message to statements made by Iranian 
leadership. By using this process, I hoped to glean some useful information about the 
Iranian messaging strategy, and the information might then prove useful for identifying 
areas of concern for the homeland security practitioner, as well as for crafting an 
American counter-message. 
No evidence was found to indicate that the Iranian news websites were being used 
to radicalize or recruit Americans to commit acts of violence against their government. 
However, as the data was collected, a troubling pattern emerged. Conspiracy theories 
were a large part of the Iranian message. Research into conspiracy theories indicated that 
conspiracy theories might have a negative effect on democracies by increasing distrust in 
the government and reducing a person’s likelihood to vote in the future. Rumors, often 
used to spread conspiracy theories, have been associated with civil unrest.22  Rumors 
have also been used in the past by America’s enemies to spread disinformation. As a 
result, a large focus of this thesis shifted to an understanding of rumors and conspiracy 
theories and their potential impact on American security.  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. The Information Age, Social Media and Intelligence  
Social media’s impact on world affairs has been significant. For example, the use 
of the Internet and social media fueled a movement by the people in several Middle 
Eastern and North African countries to topple their governments.23 
19 “Media Environment Guide: Iran.” 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 United States National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (NACCD) and Otto Kerner, 
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, March 1, 1968 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1968 
23 “New Study Quantifies Use.” 
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The global shift into the information age and the role of the Internet and social 
media has dramatically changed how the world communicates and shares information. A 
2012 world Internet usage survey showed that 34.3 percent of the world’s population uses 
the Internet—an increase of 566.4 percent since 2000.24  In a one-year period between 
2011 and 2012, the percentage of the world’s population using Facebook rose from 9.1 
percent to 12.6 percent.25  The percentage of Americans using social media today is even 
higher. A Pew Research poll in 2012 showed that this was most profound among users 
aged 49 and younger. As of May 2013, among users in the 18-to-29 age group, 89 
percent used social networking sites and, among the users in the 30-to-49 age group, 78 
percent used social networking sites as of May 2013.26  
Social media provides intelligence-gathering opportunities to the United States, its 
rivals and its enemies. America’s enemies and rivals will be able to use social media for 
direct access to an even larger portion of the American people.   This should be of 
particular concern to homeland security professionals. For example, social media has 
already been used by al Qaeda to radicalize and inspire persons in the United States to 
commit terrorist acts in support of al Qaeda’s ideology.27  Nation states such as Iran have 
also turned to Facebook and other social media platforms to spread their messages in 
English to the Western world. Iranian examples include the Facebook pages for The 
YJC,28 PressTV29 and the Iranian Student’s News Agency.30  Perhaps the people of the 
United States are capable of discerning the subtleties of propaganda, making its 
censorship unnecessary. It is also quite possible that censorship of such messaging might 
24 “World Internet Users Statistics Usage and World Population Stats,” Internet World Stats, accessed 
October 27, 2013, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. 
25 “Facebook Growth and Penetration in the World - Facebook Statistics,” Internet World Stats, 
accessed October 27, 2013, http://www.internetworldstats.com/facebook.htm. 
26 Joanna Brenner, “Pew Internet: Social Networking,” Pew Internet, August 5, 2013, 
http://pewinternet.org/Commentary/2012/March/Pew-Internet-Social-Networking-full-detail.aspx. 
27 Brian Michael Jenkins, Is Al Qaeda’s Internet Strategy Working? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2011), 2–3, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2011/RAND_CT371.pdf. 
28 “YJC.ir, “Facebook, accessed October 28, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club. 
29 “Tehran, Iran - Media/News/Publishing.” 
30 “ISNA Iranian Students’ News Agency, ” Facebook, accessed October 2, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Iranian-Students-News-Agency-ISNA/222237964600170. 
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hurt America’s image more than it helps. However, it is also possible that the propaganda 
of rivals such as Iran, or al Qaeda, might find resonance in segments of our population.    
2. Iranian Media Activities on the Internet—A Historical Review since 
the Islamic Revolution  
The first Iranian Internet message was sent in 1993. In the Middle East and Near 
East regions, Iranian access to the Internet was only preceded by Israel. The growth rate 
of Internet users in Iran from 1993 to 2006 was amongst the fastest in the world.31  The 
Iranian regime embraced the Internet as a tool to enable advances in science and 
technology, as well as to improve governmental efficiency and to spread Iran’s 
revolutionary ideals. However, many Iranian citizens were also quick to embrace the 
freedom of the Internet to express their grievances and to talk about issues that they were 
not permitted to discuss in public. Not too surprisingly, the government has resorted to 
increased levels of censorship to put a damper on dissent, or as a conservative response to 
reformist ideas.32  
Iranian officials have affirmed their belief that the Western world is conducting a 
“soft war” campaign aimed at Iran.33  In 2010, Hojjatoleslam Ali Saidi, Iranian Supreme 
Leader’s representative in the Revolutionary Guards, attended a meeting on “confronting 
the soft war.”34 At the meeting, he stressed, “We see that at every election, the enemy 
uses this secular and liberal movement to reach its aims.”35 
An article on Iran and the soft war in the International Journal of 
Communications further illustrates Iran’s concerns:  
The events of the Arab Spring instilled in many authorities the 
considerable fear that they could too easily lose control over the narratives 
31 Babak Rahimi, “Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran,” Middle East 7, no. 3 (2003): 
102. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Payam Mohseni, “The Islamic Awakening: Iran’s Grand Narrative of the Arab Uprisings,” Middle 
East Brief, no. 71 (April 2013): 4, http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB71.pdf. 




                                                 
of legitimacy that undergird their power. This threat to national power was 
already a part of central thinking in Iran. Their reaction to the Arab Spring 
was especially marked because of a long-held feeling that strategic 
communicators from outside the state’s borders were purposely 
reinforcing domestic discontent.36 
After the conclusion of the 2009 Green Revolution, the Iranians placed the blame 
for the protests on the West and its soft-war efforts. Jailed protestors were forced to 
confess on Iranian-run media in an effort to convince the Iranian people that Iran was the 
victim.37  
Iran has responded to the alleged soft-war efforts of the West by tightening 
control over Internet access38 and by building up its own cyber-war capabilities. Iran has 
mobilized a large numbers of its citizens to counter the pro-Western message in 
cyberspace, and they have created thousands of blogs and websites that push Iran’s world 
view and image. The Iranians have a virtual army on popular social media platforms such 
as Facebook. They post pro-Iranian messages, work to undermine pro-Western views, 
organize complaints to shut down social media pages they deem offensive, and, more 
chillingly, they report fellow Iranians who they believe are working against Iran or its 
brand of Islam to the Iranian cyber police, known by the acronym FATA.39  In 2012, Iran 
created a soft-war headquarters to counter the threats from the United States and Israel; 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Iran’s Armed Forces, BrigGen. Massoud Jazayeri, affirmed 
Iran’s commitment to soft-war strategies when he said, “We too must develop an 
organized means to address the fight with the enemy in this arena.”40 
36 Monroe Price, “Iran and the Soft War,” International Journal of Communication 6 (2012), 
ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewDownloadInterstitial/1654/799. 
37 “Newsweek Reporter in Iran Reportedly ‘Confesses,’ ” CNN, accessed July 11, 2013, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/07/01/iran.newsweek/. 
38 “Iran Launches ‘Halal Internet,’ ” DOHA Centre For Media Freedom, accessed July 11, 2013, 
http://www.dc4mf.org/en/content/iran-launches-halal-Internet. 
39 Cyrus Farivar, “Iranian Gov’t Pays Paramilitary Hackers, Bloggers to Bring You Islamic 
Revolution 2.0,” Ars Technica,” June 6, 2012, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/iran-expands-
online/. 
40 Joanna Paraszczuk, “Iran Establishes Cyber HQ as Shadow War Continues,” Israel News, accessed 
July 11, 2013, http://www.jpost.com/Iranian-Threat/News/Iran-establishes-cyber-HQ-as-shadow-war-
continues. 
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The public nature of Iran’s soft-war campaign presents intelligence collectors and 
analysts with an opportunity to gather useful information about an otherwise largely 
unknown foe. 
3. Strategies for Analysis of Propaganda  
Propaganda experienced a period of great expansion with the creation of mass 
media in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Mass media included print, radio and 
television.41  Harold Lasswell conducted scholarly analysis of propaganda early in his 
career as a political scientist, without taking a political position. Early on, he searched for 
an understanding of patterns in propaganda that “would reveal its strategies and ultimate 
effectiveness.”42  Open source intelligence analysis was built on Lasswell’s theory.43   
Lasswell’s formula broke down an act of communication into five parts:  
Who… 
Says What… 
In Which Channel… 
To Whom… 
With What Effect 
Open source analysts using this model could attempt to learn the thoughts and 
intentions of foreign leaders by analyzing the content of their nation’s propaganda.44  
Since propaganda has a purpose, its structure yields clues to its creators’ thought process. 
For example, during World War II, Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels revealed 
sufficient information in his messages to the German people about a new weapon for 
41 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 
2011), 97. 
42 Ibid., 105. 
43 Anthony Olcott, Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World (New York: Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2012), 177. 
44 Ibid. 
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British analysts to accurately predict the type and nature of the weapon—in this case the 
V-1 flying bomb— as well as its expected deployment dates.45 
However, since the information age and the rise of the Internet, the analyst’s job 
is more difficult because there is simply more available data to sift through. While it is 
true that mass media still exists and an analyst can still look there for clues to what 
leaders are saying, the analyst now has access to what other segments of society might be 
saying as well, without having to be actually present in distant locales. Furthermore, the 
Internet now makes it possible for the analyst to view content from persons who, in the 
past, would have had to resort to leaflets and posters.46  Joseph Nye, a proponent of soft 
power, made a similar observation about this global shift into the information age in an 
article titled “Cyber Power”: 
Struggles among governments, corporations, and individuals are not new, 
but the low price of entry, anonymity, and asymmetries in vulnerability 
means that smaller actors have more capacity to exercise hard and soft 
power in cyberspace than in many more traditional domains of world 
politics.47 
Olcott, in his work on open-source intelligence asserts that, in today’s social 
media age:  
Media do not dictate to audiences, but rather groups now choose media to 
aggregate, reinforce one another, and form communities of shared interest. 
This nearly reverses the Lasswell formula—a group of people trying to 
achieve a certain effect cluster around a medium or media to find and 
build an audience that will share their interest and join in achieving the 
effect.”48 
Olcott’s observation about the reversal of Lasswell’s formula can be illustrated 
through al Qaeda’s use of the Internet and social media. Individuals sympathetic to al 
Qaeda’s ideology coalesce around Internet forums and social media groups, which are 
formed and populated by persons with shared interests. Olcott’s work suggests that an 
45 Alexander L. George, Propaganda Analysis (New York: Row, Peterson and Company) 1959, 23.  
46 Olcott, Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World, 170–180. 
47 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Cyber Power” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “ May 2010, 
19, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=23927. 
48 Olcott, Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World, 197. 
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analyst looking at a decentralized organization like al Qaeda might be better served to 
study the media around which the group’s decentralized elements gather to support, or 
reinforce one another.  
4. Rumors, Conspiracy Theories and Propaganda 
The way in which a message is introduced and then echoed in social media, 
sometimes reaching a crescendo, is often referred to as “going viral.”  Psychology seems 
to play a role in this phenomenon. For example, recent studies have shown that messages 
that arouse strong emotions, whether positive or negative, are more likely to capture 
public attention and spread on the Internet.49  Robert Knapp headed an anti-rumor bureau 
in World War II, and his work on rumors as a weapon made similar observations.50  He 
observed that successful rumors were self-propelling, exploited the emotions and 
sentiments of a group, and could both express and form public opinion at the same 
time.51  Conspiracy theories are often spread by rumors. This suggests that social media 
analysts might find useful models in the study of rumors and conspiracy theories.   
5. World War II and the Psychology of Rumor 
During World War II, both the Axis and Allied governments were concerned 
about the spread of rumors in their countries.52 A carefully crafted rumor could become a 
powerful psychological weapon. For example, when a German invasion of England 
seemed imminent in the summer of 1940, a rumor was spread that the British military had 
a secret weapon that literally could set the sea ablaze and destroy the German invasion 
forces in a blazing inferno. The spread of the rumor was a success. A captured German 
pilot told his interrogators that the weapon was common knowledge amongst his 
49 “These Scientists Studied Why Internet Stories Go Viral. You Won’t Believe What They Found,”  
Fast Company, accessed January 28, 2014, http://www.fastcodesign.com/3024276/evidence/these-
scientists-studied-why-Internet-stories-go-viral-you-wont-believe-what-they-f. 
50 Olcott, Open Source Intelligence in a Networked World, 182–183. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Richards, Lee, “Whispers of War: The British World War II Rumour Campaign,” Psywar, January 
26, 2005, http://www.psywar.org/sibs.php. 
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squadron mates.53  The German High Command must have believed the rumors as well, 
since they conducted some unsuccessful experiments to protect their invasion fleet with 
flame-retardant asbestos. The British rumor had both demoralized and deceived their 
enemy.54   
In the absence of hard facts, a quite normal state of affairs under wartime 
censorship, rumors would be created and spread to fill the void of public 
information. Since those rumors could do a great deal of damage, as in the 
previous example, a study of rumor itself would be valuable. In 1944, 
Robert H. Knapp published an article detailing his study of rumor. The 
article was simply titled, “The Psychology of Rumor.”55   
During the war, Knapp was in charge of rumor control for the Massachusetts 
Committee of Public Safety, so he was intimately familiar with the subject matter. The 
popular publication Reader’s Digest was used to collect information on rumors from its 
readers, and the results were analyzed by the Massachusetts Committee.56   The rumors 
were classified by the Committee as fitting one of three rumor categories: pipe-dreams 
(or wish rumor), bogies, or wedge-driving (or aggressive).57  The pipe-dream rumors 
expressed wishful thinking, such as “Lloyds of London and Wall Street are betting 10-to-
1 that the war will be over by autumn.”58  The bogie rumors arose out of fear and 
anxiety, such as the rumor that “the entire Pacific Fleet was destroyed at Pearl Harbor.”59  
The aggressive wedge-driving rumors were typically motivated by hatred, and were 
actually directed at Americans, by Americans, or directed against America’s allies. An 
example of this kind of rumor was the assertion that “Churchill blackmailed Roosevelt 
into provoking war with Japan.”60  One thousand and eighty-nine rumors from all over 
the United States were collected and analyzed by the Massachusetts Committee in 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 







                                                 
1942.61  Nearly two-thirds of the rumors were categorized as wedge-driving rumors.62  
Approximately one quarter of the rumors were fear (or bogie) rumors.63  This is 
understandable in 1942, since the United States had just entered the war at the end of 
1941 and the outcome of the conflict was not certain. For that reason, it is also not 
surprising that only about 2 percent of the rumors were pipe-dreams, created by wishful 
thinking.64  
Knapp postulated that the study of rumor could be used as an “index of morale” in 
which groups susceptible to a certain type of rumor could be identified..65 Additionally, 
Knapp asserted that the volume of circulation rumors has an inverse relationship with the 
availability of official information that is “trustworthy and satisfying.”66  Finally, Knapp 
saw rumors as indicative of “underlying hopes, fears and hostilities of the group.”  For 
that reason, they are mirror reflections of the trend in morale. A rise in bogie rumors 
could be indicative of low morale and despondence, while a prevalence of wishful-
thinking rumors might indicate a trend towards a foolhardy sense of security; an increase 
in wedge-driving rumors could be revealing of a “scapegoating mentality.”67 
6. Allport and Postman’s Basic Law of Rumor 
In 1947, G.W. Allport and Leo Postman released their book The Psychology of 
Rumor.68  The book is still very heavily cited, and it builds on the foundation of work 
provided by Knapp and the wartime rumor clinics. The book’s key finding was that the 
incidence of rumor is proportional to the importance of, and level of ambiguity about, the 








68 Gordon W. Allport and Leo Postman, The Psychology of Rumor (New York: Henry Holt and 
Co.:1947). 
69 Ibid., 33–34. 
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illustrative example from the text dealt with rumors of excessive American losses that 
circulated in the United States after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.70  Since the full 
extent of American losses was not circulated in early news reports, some Americans 
began to distrust the news sources. Furthermore, there was already distrust in the 
Roosevelt administration. The American peoples’ lives had been disrupted by their 
country’s sudden entrance into the war, and there was a great deal of fear prevalent. In 
this example, ambiguity was generated by distrust and fear, and the country’s 
involvement in a world war gave importance to the topic. It was no surprise that rumors 
of excessive American losses were generated. The rumors continued to persist, even after 
President Roosevelt addressed them in one of his fireside chats. A poll of college students 
showed that the president’s chat did create a drop (from 69 percent to 46 percent) in their 
belief in the rumors of excessive American losses, but if that result were extrapolated to 
the entire population, a large percentage of Americans kept believing the damaging 
rumors.71  
7. Rumor Psychology and the Iraq War 
Knapp’s study has stood the test of time, as evidenced by a Naval Postgraduate 
School master’s thesis written by Stephanie R. Kelly, titled “Rumors in Iraq: a Guide to 
Winning Hearts and Minds.”72 In Kelly’s estimation, the study of rumors can provide 
actionable intelligence for the field commander.73 Kelly analyzed rumors collected from 
Iraqis in the period after the American invasion in 2003–2004, and published his findings 
in a publication created by an American open-source intelligence worker. The rumors 
were placed in a weekly feature titled, “What’s the Word on the Streets of Baghdad.”  
Knapp’s categorization of rumors as wishful thinking, bogeys, or wedge-driving was 
used in Kelly’s study. The data showed a high incidence of negative rumors in Iraq. 
Almost 70 percent of the rumors reflected hostility and fear. The rumor generation 
70 Ibid., 3–6. 
71 Ibid., 5. 




                                                 
suggested that the Iraqi people were experiencing high levels of anxiety, uncertainty and 
hostility; these emotions influence their perception of the Coalition.74  Kelly’s findings 
indicate that the Iraqis were far more concerned about politics and governance, quality of 
life issues and the insurgency than they were about the pictures of prisoner abuse from 
Abu Ghraib. This ran counter to the negative feelings the same pictures produced in the 
United States, which became the focus of American communicators. Kelly’s findings 
also suggest that American efforts in Iraq would have been better served by giving the 
populace more detailed and reliable information about the future Iraqi government and 
politics. This kind of information could have prevented the formation of detrimental 
rumors that arose out of the desire for information.75  
8. Rosnow and Ongoing Research into Rumor Psychology 
Ralph L. Rosnow has devoted a great deal of time and study to rumor psychology. 
In a 1991 article about rumor psychology, Rosnow stated that Allport and Postman’s 
major insights were still “as fresh as bread from the oven.”76 Rosnow has built on their 
work with further studies and data; he now postulates that four conditions affect the 
creation and circulation of rumors: general uncertainty, outcome-relevant involvement, 
personal anxiety and credulity.77   
Rosnow points out that his term “general uncertainty” seems be synonymous with 
Allport and Postman’s ambiguity, but Rosnow noted that, although most of the literature 
on rumor depends on uncertainty, an experiment that indicated that a rumor could still be 
spread in the absence of cognitive unclarity.78 He theorized the example of Paul 
McCartney’s rumored death in 1961, which circulated despite convincing evidence that 
the musician was alive. The rumor circulated because the audience considered the 
situation to be sufficiently vague and unclear, owing to the efforts of “underground” 
74 Ibid. 
75 Kelly, Rumors in Iraq: A Guide to Winning Hearts and Minds. 





                                                 
channels that created and spread the rumor.79  Keep this example in mind when this 
thesis later discusses the conspiracy theories contained in the message content transmitted 
in English by YJC and PressTV. 
Outcome-relevant involvement is Rosnow’s substitute for the importance that was 
a key variable in Allport and Postman’s rumor transmission equation.80  Rosnow cited 
some research or observations that tended to contradict importance as a key variable. For 
example, one wartime observation noted that, of three rumors of prime importance 
planted by the group, one rumor’s circulation was actually damaged by its importance.81  
Additionally, Canadian researcher Joseph Scanlon noted in a study of rumors circulated 
after a damaging windstorm that the subjects in his study were more likely to rate the 
rumors that they personally passed on as unimportant.82  Although Rosnow sees high 
personal involvement as a factor in rumor creation and transmission, he also believes that 
there is “less critical examination when outcome-relevant information is low.”83  For this 
reason, Rosnow analogizes spreading an inconsequential rumor to “firing a shot in the 
dark.”84  
Allport and Postman’s work would seem to already have addressed Rosnow’s 
variable of personal anxiety as a component of importance. They identified the need for 
some to rationalize and relieve their anxiety as a possible motive for rumor. An example 
of this can be found in the negative rumors that circulated after the Pearl Harbor attack.85  
Allport and Postman summed it up well by stating, “Why shouldn’t I feel panicky?  Our 
fleet was wiped out a Pearl Harbor.”86  Rosnow gave examples that indicated that rumors 







85 Allport and Postman, “The Psychology of Rumor,” 3–6. 
86 Ibid., 37. 
87 Rosnow, “Inside Rumor: A Personal Journey.” 
 15 
                                                 
Rosnow also noted that data from studies of racial rioting in the 1960s, and among Asian 
emerges from Idi Amin’s Uganda and evidence that increased levels of fear, stress and 
uncertainty were more likely to create a surge of rumors.88 
Rosnow explained that credulity was not dealt with by Allport and Postman’s 
basic law of rumor,89 though they did indicate that a rumor was likely to contain a 
“kernel of truth.”90  Essentially, Rosnow indicated that a person would be more likely to 
spread a rumor if the teller found it to be trustworthy.91  If a person were to circulate a 
rumor that was later proved to be false, whether it be a wish rumor or a dread rumor, then 
that person might face angry backlash or resentment. The rumormonger might also lose 
future credibility. A person might still pass dread rumors if that person were to have an 
ulterior or devious motive.92  Rosnow noted that trust in a rumor was in the eye of the 
beholder.93  A person’s judgment can be swayed by data and evidence, but it can also be 
influenced by stereotypes, prejudices and emotions. In times of uncertainty and fear, it 
might not take much hard data to convince a person to give credence to a rumor, 
especially one that contains that “kernel of truth.”94    
Rosnow likened the spreading of rumors to firing a gun; the gun represents the 
public and the rumors are bullets for loading the gun.95  Rosnow came up with some 
strategies for rumor control based on the gun metaphor. First, it might be wise to keep 
lines of communication open and to provide reliable and truthful information about 
subjects, or incidents, that are likely to be of importance, or sources of anxiety.96  In this 
way, there should be less ammunition available to load the gun. Also, improving the 
populace’s critical thinking skills and educating the public about the psychology of rumor 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Allport and Postman, “The Psychology of Rumor,” 33. 







                                                 
itself might keep the people from “loading the gun” in the first place.97  Homeland 
security professionals should always be cognizant of this prevention strategy, because 
failure invites disaster. For example, in a 1968 study on civil disorders, “rumors 
significantly aggravated tensions and disorder in more than 65 percent of the disorders 
studied.”98  If prevention fails, and the gun goes off, Rosnow states that the strategy is to 
“keep the gun from going off repeatedly.”99  The rumors that are in circulation will give 
an indication of the source of “the people’s anxieties and uncertainties.”100  Armed with 
that information, it will then be possible to craft messaging and actions to dispense  
information that removes the uncertainties and to allay the anxieties. Rosnow added that, 
if the rumor gun goes off repeatedly, the strategy should be to minimize the damage that 
the volley of rumors can cause.101  Rosnow suggested that one way to do this might be to 
take legal action against the producers of the false rumor; this action would bring 
attention to the miscreants and to the false nature of their rumors.102   
9. Rumor and the Internet  
The advent of the Internet allowed for further study into the psychology of rumor 
without the limitations inherent in the face-to-face laboratory environment. In the case of 
Internet content open to the public, the observer’s activity is unobtrusive and would likely 
stand up against challenges of ethical misconduct.103  The data is digitally preserved, 
facilitating easy access by the interested observer, while affording the observer a chance 
to analyze a social group and its communications in a natural setting. This makes it 
possible to unobtrusively observe group interaction in the communication of a rumor.104 
97 Ibid. 
98 NACCD and Kerner, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, March 1, 
1968. 




103 Prashant Bordia, “Studying Verbal Interaction on the Internet: The Case of Rumor Transmission 
Research,” Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers 28, no. 2 (1996): 149–51. 
104 Ibid. 
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Bordia and Rosnow conducted a content analysis of a public Internet discussion 
group focused on a rumor about Prodigy, a service owned by International Business 
Machines Corporation (IBM) and Sears, Roebuck and Company.105  At that time, 
Prodigy used phone lines to provide its service to personal computer users. The rumor 
that circulated on the forum was that Prodigy was using their access to personal 
computers to harvest information from their subscribers’ computer hard drives.106  
Bordia and Rosnow analyzed the data from their study in an attempt to answer four 
research questions: 
RQ1: Do the kinds of statements that people make while communicating a 
rumor and the incidence of these statements reflect the confluence of 
variables noted in recent rumor theory?107     
RQ2: Does the usage of the statements identified in RQl group or profile 
the participants in a meaningful way that is consistent with sociological 
theorizing?108 
RQ3: Do CMC (computer-mediated communications) groups exhibit the 
developmental pattern reported for FtF (face-to-face) groups?109 
RQ4: Does a CMC rumor discussion exhibit group development 
patterns?110 
The data suggested that the answer to RQ1 is “yes.”  The prudent statements that 
began the discussion dropped off as anxiety increased.111  Based on Rosnow’s earlier 
research findings about rumor, this makes sense. The persons who started the rumor 
would have been concerned about the negative personal implications should the rumor 
prove to be false, so the calls for prudence included in their initial statements could be 
viewed as innocuous qualifiers. Once the anxiety levels were increased and the rumor 
105 Prashant Bordia and Ralph L. Rosnow, “Rumor Rest Stops on the Information Highway 
Transmission Patterns in a Computer-Mediated Rumor Chain,” Human Communication Research 25, no. 2 
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gained momentum, the concern about backlash from participation in the rumor 
mongering was largely eliminated. Interrogatory statements were very high on day one, 
which coincided with the group’s search for information.112  Apprehensive statements, 
which indicated anxiety, peaked on day four. This also makes sense based on Rosnow’s 
earlier research that showed rumors will persist until anxiety is reduced.113 
The answer to RQ2 was also in the affirmative, and seemed to agree with 
sociological theorizing about rumor.114  The Internet discussion group’s messaging about 
the rumor showed a clustering of persons within the group. Those clusters included 
skeptical disbelievers—a positivistic group that took an analytical approach to validation 
of the rumor and sought out authentication and justification; apprehensive believers—
who mixed anxious and apprehensive statements with belief statements; a cluster of 
anxious responders—a group that was predominantly anxious as a result of the rumor; a 
cluster of curious responders—who provided interrogatory responses; and, finally, the 
previously mentioned prudent initiators of the discussion.115 
The answers to RQ3 and RQ4 were also “yes.”  The rumor discussion followed 
the four expected stages of group development. On day one, dependency statements were 
high, which corresponded with the initial stage of group development, in which a group 
explores and identifies acceptable behavior.116  On day two, counter-dependency 
statements peaked, which corresponds with the second stage of group development, when 
a group deals with conflict and competition.117  The third stage of group development is a 
period when group trust and structure builds, and it is accompanied by fight-and-flight 







118 Susan A. Wheelan, Barbara Davidson and Felice Tilin, “Group Development Across Time Reality 
or Illusion?” Small Group Research 34, no. 2 (2003): 223–45. 
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study.119  This might reflect a difference between the online environment and face-to-
face interaction. Unlike in the lab setting, a person only views an Internet page when the 
desire to do so arises, at which point there is no pressure to participate in a discussion that 
might be present in a group gathering in a physical space.120  Pairing statements 
(agreement, friendship and unity) should rise in the third stage of group development; the 
study data showed that they peaked at 34.4 percent on the last day of the rumor 
discussion.121  As expected, the number of counter-pairing statements was highest on day 
two, corresponding to the second (conflict) stage of group development.122  Finally, work 
statements peaked on day four, which corresponded with the fourth stage of group 
development—the work stage. Once the group had dealt with issues of what constituted 
acceptable behavior and conflict, and built trust and a group structure, then work could 
begin.123   
An interesting conclusion that might be drawn from comparing Bordia and 
Rosnow’s study with a study of small physical groups (conducted by Wheelan, Davidson, 
and Tilin)124 is that the Internet significantly shortens the time necessary for group 
development—from months to mere days. If group-development time is shortened, then 
it seems likely that the speed of rumor transmission should also increase. 
10. Conspiracy Theories 
Rumors and conspiracy theories are closely tied. A conspiracy theory can be 
defined as “an effort to explain some event or practice by reference to the machinations 
of powerful people, who have also managed to conceal their role.”125 Here we see the 
key difference between a rumor and a conspiracy theory: the role of a secretive cabal. 





124 Wheelan, Davidson, and Tilin, “Group Development Across Time Reality or Illusion?” 
125 Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 17, no. 2 (2009): 4. 
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Rumors provide a mechanism by which a conspiracy theory spreads through a 
population. For example, there are various conspiracy theories on the Internet that 
attempt to identify the “real” culprits behind 9/11, but, in this author’s opinion, those 
theories are typically summed up and spread by the rumor that 9/11 was an inside job. 
Evidence of the damage caused by this rumor can be found in a 2006 Scripps News/Ohio 
University poll, in which 36 percent of the respondents at least suspected that the U.S. 
government played a role in 9/11.126 
In modern America, conspiracy theories are alive and well. In a recent Rasmussen 
poll, 37 percent of adults believed that President John F. Kennedy’s assassination was a 
conspiratorial plot; 23 percent believed that President Barack Obama was not an 
American citizen; 24 percent believed that the American government knew in advance 
about the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but did nothing about it; 14 percent believed the moon 
landings were faked; and 8 percent still believed that the AIDS virus was created in a 
CIA laboratory.127 If you include the number of surveyed people who are undecided 
about these poll questions, then the numbers look even worse. Why do so many 
Americans believe in unproven, or worse yet, demonstrably false, conspiracy theories?  
We live in the information age, yet disinformation continues to thrive.    
11. Some Conspiracy Theories are Conspiracy Fact 
One reason conspiracy theories might get traction is because some past 
conspiracy theories turned out to be facts. For example, President Richard Nixon was 
involved in the Watergate cover-up, and, in 1953, the CIA actually overthrew the 
democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh. Additionally, the 
Public Health Service conducted a study about doctors of African-American syphilitic 
males but did not inform their patients of their actual medical condition and did not treat 
the patients with penicillin.   
126 “Field Guide to the Conspiracy Theorist: Dark Minds,” Psychology Today, accessed June 10, 2014, 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200909/field-guide-the-conspiracy-theorist-dark-minds. 
127 “Have We Got A Conspiracy for You—9/11? JFK? Obama’s Citizenship?” Rasmussen Reports, 




                                                 
12. Hofstadter and the Paranoid Tendency 
One of the earliest scholarly articles about conspiracy theories was written by 
Richard Hofstadter. In his 1964 article, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” 
Hofstadter determined the “paranoid tendency” came from irreconcilable opposing 
interests that were locked in battle over ethnic, religious or class conflicts.128  In such 
struggles, Hofstadter noted that the extremist right was unable to engage in 
compromise.129  The essence of Hofstadter’s article is that the extreme right took to the 
generation of conspiracy theories to explain social changes that challenged their status 
quo, just as millenarians had done in centuries past.130  In retrospect, Hofstadter’s 
exclusive focus on the extremist right might have been somewhat narrow. One interesting 
takeaway from Hofstadter’s writing is his portrayal of Alger Hiss as an alleged 
conspirator. More recent evidence would seem to prove that at least some of that paranoia 
was justified, since the CIA’s Venona files point quite convincingly to Alger Hiss as 
being a Soviet agent.131  This does not mean that all of the accusations of communist 
infiltration in America were correct, but it does provide us with another example of a 
conspiracy theory that would seem to have been proven true. 
When Hofstadter’s work is compared to the previously mentioned studies on the 
psychology of rumor, the common thread seems to be a link between both rumor and 
conspiracy theory to anxiety. Rosnow, Allport and Postman all pointed to rumors as 
filling a need for some to rationalize and relieve their anxiety. Hofstadter’s “paranoid 
tendency” would also seem to be based on the need to rationalize and relieve anxiety. 




131 “The Alger Hiss Case,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed November 28, 2014, 
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13. From the Perspective of Social Psychology 
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule put forth their more balanced look at 
conspiracy theories in their article “Conspiracy Theory: Causes and Cures.”132  Sunstein 
and Vermeule wrote that several factors are responsible for the creation and spread of 
conspiracy theories. These factors include crippled epistemologies, rumors and 
speculation, group polarization and selection effects.133   
Most people have little direct information on which they base their knowledge or 
beliefs. Therefore, their foundation for knowledge rests on others’ thoughts. Some 
persons are “crippled” by knowing very little, or by what they do know being 
incorrect.134  This is especially true of extremists. For a person suffering from an 
extremist crippled epistemology, a conspiracy theory might seem to be an entirely 
rational explanation for a stunning turn of events. 
The role of rumors and speculation in the formation of conspiracy theories should 
come as no surprise to anyone who has studied the psychology of rumor and is familiar 
with the works of Knapp, Allport and Postman, and Rosnow. What Sunstein and 
Vermeule add here is the role of the “conspiracy entrepreneur,” who profits from the 
spread of the conspiracy theory.135  Some of these entrepreneurs might, in fact, be sincere 
in their motives, but Sunstein and Vermeule believe that others are motivated by 
monetary greed or by the achievement of a societal goal.136  This is something that will 
be revisited in an upcoming section in this chapter that analyzes conspiracy theories and 
PressTV.   
Conspiracy cascades are mechanisms that act to push more persons to accept a 
conspiracy theory. If a person only has weak information to challenge the theory, or 
wants to go along with the crowd, or because the triggering event at the origin of the 
conspiracy theory is symbolic of an important issue of public concern, then that person 






                                                 
might tend to accept the conspiracy theory. As more persons succumb to the theory for 
the same reasons, momentum increases and cascades take place, drawing more and more 
persons into accepting the conspiracy theory’s validity.137 
Group polarization refers to the phenomenon that occurs when a group engages in 
discussion about an issue.138 After the discussion, the group will end up in a more 
extreme position that agrees with their previous tendencies. The factors that produce 
conspiracy cascades are mirrored in the process of group polarization.139   
Finally, after cascades and group polarization grow and shape a group supporting 
a conspiracy theory, some persons who have doubts or lesser faith in the theory will leave 
the group. The group will then consist of persons who are more committed to the cause. 
Selection effects such as this can lead to fanaticism. Group members might segregate 
themselves from outsiders who challenge their theory, and their leaders might enforce 
that separation in an effort to maintain their hold on the reins of group power.140  
According to Sunstein and Vermeule, the result can be a “paranoid cognition.”141 The 
group will not trust the motives and actions of those in larger society.    
Conspiracy Theories go Mainstream? 
Michael Barkun wrote that “the essence of conspiracy beliefs lies in attempts to 
delineate and explain evil.”142  Barkun’s approach to the matter echoes Hofstadter’s 
linkage of conspiracy beliefs to millenarianism. Barkun indicated that conspiracy theories 
have an allure because they reduce complex events to simple stories of good versus 
evil.143 Conspiracy beliefs are a form of stigmatized knowledge—knowledge that is 






142 Michael Barkun, Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America, 
Vol. 15 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 3. 
143 Ibid., 182. 
144 Ibid., 12. 
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is finding its way into the mainstream. When mainstream media makes references to 
“FEMA here, an allusion to microchips there,”145 this can create curiosity that can be 
satisfied immediately through Internet access to even more conspiracy material.146   
14. So What? 
If it is true that there is widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories in the 
United States, why is it significant? 
A recent psychological study showed that exposure to conspiracy theories has a 
damaging effect on democracies. The results showed that exposure to conspiracy theories 
tends to reduce a person’s likeliness to vote in the future, and were directly linked to 
increased feelings of powerlessness and uncertainty toward the government.147  How 
long can a democratic government be perceived as legitimate if voter participation drops 
and its constituents feel powerless or uncertain?   
Another danger associated with conspiracy theories is the linkage of rumors to 
civil unrest. According to Allport and Postman, “no riot ever occurs without rumors to 
incite, accompany and intensify the violence.”148  Once again, this link between rumor 
and civil unrest was reinforced by the 1968 study on civil disorders.149  If rumors provide 
a mechanism by which a conspiracy theory spreads through a population, then it follows 
that a conspiracy theory could also be linked to civil unrest.   
Conspiracy theories can also be used to radicalize an extremist group and can be a 
factor in that group’s turn to violence.150  Additionally, conspiracy theories can be used 
145 Barkun, Culture of Conspiracy: Apocalyptic Visions in Contemporary America, 238. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Jolley and Douglas, “The Social Consequences of Conspiracism.” 
148 Allport and Postman, “The Psychology of Rumor,” 193. 
149 Disorders and Kerner, Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, March 1, 
1968. 
150 Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, The Power of Unreason: Conspiracy Theories, Extremism and 
Counter-Terrorism (London: Demos, 2010), 24. 
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to demonize the group’s enemies and delegitimize the group’s critics,151 while also 
justifying violent action.152     
Wedge-driving rumors and conspiracy theories might also be created by persons 
or organizations with the intent of doing harm. Operation INFEKTION is an example of 
this kind of rumor. In the 1980s, Soviet agents planted a rumor that AIDS had been 
created as a result of the Pentagon’s biological weapons research.153  This disinformation 
campaign had some success and outlasted the Soviet Union by decades. Derivations of 
the story were still circulating in Africa as late as 2004, when Wangari Maathai, a 
Kenyan biologist who won the Nobel peace prize, asserted that AIDS was created by 
“evil-minded scientists” to “wipe out the black race.”154  In the United States, a 2005 
RAND study showed that almost 50 percent of African Americans believed the AIDS 
virus was manmade, and over 25 percent of them believed it was created in a government 
laboratory.155  One reason for the persistence of the AIDS conspiracy theory in the 
African American community is its link to another event that was confirmed as fact—the 
Public Health Service study of syphilis patients in the black community.156  In that study, 
appropriate treatment of the male black syphilis patients was not provided so that the 
effects of syphilis on the patients could be observed. The patients were never told that 
they had syphilis. Distrust and fear of the government arising from that outrageous event 
created fertile ground for the AIDS conspiracy theory to flourish in the African American 
community.   
Most of the research on rumor and conspiracy theories discussed thus far was 
conducted by Western researchers. A large amount of that research, particularly the 
research about rumor psychology, was conducted in wartime; the researchers were 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid., 29. 
153 Thomas Boghardt, “Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation Campaign,” Studies in 
Intelligence 4 (2009): 1–20. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 “U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee,” Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, accessed November 29, 2014, http://www.cdc.gov/Features/Tuskegee/. 
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therefore thinking about the international dimension. A similar approach would prove 
useful for a greater understanding of the role of conspiracy theories in the 
international arena. 
15. Conspiracy Theories in the Middle East and the Near East, Including 
Iran 
Americans do not have a monopoly on the creation and spread of conspiracy 
theories. They are also common in the Middle and Near East, including Iran. Sometimes 
the same conspiracy theories are circulated in both regions of the world. For example: 
In a poll conducted in seven Muslim countries, 78 percent of respondents 
said that they do not believe the 9/11 attacks were carried out by Arabs. 
The most popular account in these countries is that 9/11 was the work of 
the U.S. or Israeli governments.157  
It is thought provoking to compare the results of this poll to the results cited 
earlier from a polling of Americans. In that poll, 24 percent of respondents believed that 
the U.S. government knew in advance about the 9/11 attacks and did nothing about it. 
Although the poll questions must have differed, it seems that, in the Middle East, over 
three times as many people opted for the conspiracy theory explanation.  
As evidenced by the data collected for this thesis, conspiracy theories are also a 
common feature in Iranian discourse. Conspiracies involving the United States and Israel 
are quite common. Other authors have written about the Iranian predilection for 
conspiracy theories158 and the seeming ubiquity of conspiracy theories throughout the 
Middle East.159 A psychological study also noted that a “susceptibility to believe in 
conspiracy theories is more pronounced in Near Eastern countries (i.e., Turkey) than in 
Western countries (Germany, U.K./Ireland, U.S.).”160  One study suggested that a link 
157 Sunstein and Vermeule, “Conspiracy Theories: Causes and Cures.” 
158 Ashraf, Ahmad, “Conspiracy Theories,” Encyclopaedia Iranica, December 15, 1992, 
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/conspiracy-theories. 
159 Matthew Gray, Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World: Sources and Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2010). 
160 Martin Bruder et al., “Measuring Individual Differences in Generic Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories 
across Cultures: Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire.,” Frontiers in Psychology 4 (2013), 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1437975041?accountid=12702. 
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between the prevalence of conspiracy theories in the Middle East and child-rearing 
practices,161 but, without further research, other factors seem to be more significant.   
The origins of conspiracy theories in the Middle East will quite naturally have 
some similarities to their American counterparts. Based on the previously discussed body 
of literature on rumor and conspiracy theory, conspiracy theories can be seen as a form of 
communal sense-making about issues and events that contribute to public anxiety or 
uncertainty. The conspiracy theory narrative takes the real-world complexities 
surrounding those issues and events and reduces them to a simpler explanation that finds 
linkage between those issues and events and a secretive cabal of powerful actors working 
behind the scenes.   
In the Middle East and Iran, conspiracy theories are often rooted in the history of 
the region. The actions of Western colonial powers, superpowers in the Cold War and in 
its aftermath, the creation of Israel, and the continued involvement of outside economic 
forces have all contributed to Middle Eastern beliefs that “their societies are penetrated 
culturally and sometimes physically by external powers and Western cultural 
symbols.”162  In essence, the history of the region provides the “kernel of truth” 
described by Allport and Postman.163  For example, during World War I, the British and 
French made secret plans to divide up parts of the Ottoman Empire. The Sykes-Picot 
agreement effectively divided the territories of present day Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Israel and 
Lebanon between Britain and France, with Russian approval.164  The deal was rightly 
seen as a betrayal of promises made to the Sharif Hussein bin Ali and the Hashemite 
Arabs; it is a good example of an actual conspiracy in the region. Another actual Middle 
Eastern conspiracy took place in 1956, when Britain, France and Israel conspired to start 
161 Marvin Zonis and Craig M. Joseph, “Conspiracy Thinking in the Middle East,” Political 
Psychology, 1994, 443–59. 
162 Gray, Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World, 79. 
163 Allport and Postman, “The Psychology of Rumor.,” 39. 




                                                 
a war with Egypt, primarily to regain control over the Suez Canal after Egypt’s president, 
Nasser, had nationalized it.165 
The Iranian experience is similar. The period during World War II and its 
immediate provides several examples. During the war, neutral Iran was occupied and 
split between Russia and Britain to protect the Iranian oil fields and to open a route for 
the Western Allies to supply the Russian war effort against the German invaders.166  The 
shah was accused of bias towards the Axis powers, and the invaders resultantly removed 
him from the throne, replacing him with his son.167  Following World War II, the 
Russians reneged on their plans to withdraw from Iran after the Axis powers were 
defeated; they attempted, unsuccessfully, to manipulate and support a communist 
takeover of the Iranian government.168  Finally, as the Cold War ramped up in 1954, 
Britain and the United States conspired and covertly orchestrated the overthrow of 
Mohammed Mossadegh, the left-leaning leader of Iran, and reinstalled the shah to keep 
Iran out of the Soviet camp.169  In a region rich in actual conspiracies, it is not surprising 
that the people who live in that region would create conspiracy theories to explain other 
similar occurrences.  
Of course, it is not only Western influences that have shaped the history of the 
Middle East. The colonial period was followed by a period of Arab nationalism. During 
that era, many Arab states featured centrally controlled economies and promised a 
brighter future for their people. However, the states largely failed to deliver their 
promises. The economies of Arab states that could not fall back on oil revenues struggled 
in comparison to the West. Additionally, the Arab allies failed to defeat Israel in wars in 
1967 and 1973. These failures contribute to feelings of dissatisfaction and 
marginalization in the Arab world. A rise in conspiracy theories as a product of these 
failures should not be a surprise; according to Gray, conspiracy theories “reflect political 
165 R. W. Rathburn, “Operation Musketeer: A Military Success Ends In Political Failure,” Global 
Security, April 2, 1984, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/RRW.htm. 
166 Kaveh Farrokh, Iran at War, 1500–1988 (Oxford: Osprey, 2011), Chapter 28. Kindle edition. 
167 Farrokh, Iran at War, 1500–1988. Kindle edition. 
168 Ibid., Chapter 29. Kindle edition. 
169 Ibid., Chapter 30. Kindle edition. 
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frustrations stemming from realities, and are not just symbols of them but discourses that 
seek to make sense of them and to explain them.”170   
The popularity of conspiracy theories likely was not reduced by the period of 
repression that followed the failure of Arab nationalism and then socialism. Mubarak’s 
Egypt and Assad’s Syria are examples of Arab states that used repression to maintain 
political control over their people. Their efforts seem to have met with failure again, 
evidenced by the Arab Spring and the subsequent overthrow of Mubarak’s government 
and the ongoing civil war in Syria. Events in Egypt following the ouster of Mubarak 
likely will not help reduce the Egyptian people’s political frustration both with their own 
government and with the American government’s actions. The American government 
supported the democracy movement in Egypt, but that support waned when the first 
election resulted in the installment of an Islamist government headed by Mohammed 
Morsi. Morsi promptly gave himself sweeping political powers, which led to another 
round of Egyptian protests against the government. In the end, Morsi was removed from 
power by what can be seen as a military coup led by Field Marshal Abdul Fatah al-Sisi. 
This was followed by the outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood and repression against its 
members. Sisi was eventually elected as the president of Egypt.   
Conspiracy theories in the Middle East do not only come from the people; they 
are also spread by the state itself.171  An example of this can be found in a 2013 
newspaper story in the Egyptian daily al-Ahram. Quoting a range of retired Egyptian 
security officials, the paper’s August 27 and 28 editions suggested that Egypt faced a 
treacherous fifth column—a group of businessmen, journalists and politicians in the 
service of Western intelligence agencies were plotting to weaken the country.172    
Al-Ahram is owned by the state and is considered to be “Egypt’s newspaper of 
record.”173 There are several explanations for this kind of activity. The state might be 
170 Gray, Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World, 102. 
171 Ibid., 118. 





                                                 
talking about a conspiracy theory because it believes there actually is a conspiracy 
against the state or society.174  The state might also use conspiracy theories to shift blame 
away from the state.175  A conspiracy theory might also serve as a symbol of the state—a 
“marketing message.”176  Finally, conspiracy theories might be used to “shape the public 
perception of what is fact or fiction, or to crowd-out alternative explanations that are less 
appealing to the state.”177  In these endeavors, the Middle Eastern state gets assistance 
from its “monopolization, control or influence over mass media, strong governing party 
structures and the direction of a charismatic or domineering leader.”178  In the news story 
cited previously, it seems possible that the conspiracy theory was an attempt by the 
Egyptian government to shift blame away from the state in the aftermath of turmoil that 
led to the ouster of Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. It might also have 
been an attempt to shape public perception—an explanation of the need for repressive 
measures by Sisi’s new government.   
Iran and many Middle Eastern nations are authoritarian states. In an authoritarian 
state, the government controls, or heavily censors, the news media. Personal freedoms are 
limited and strong internal security forces protect the regime from dissent. Corruption is 
endemic among public officials. In this kind of society, why would the citizens believe 
what their leaders tell them or what they read in their newspapers?  Distrust in political 
leaders and the media must contribute to high levels of uncertainty and anxiety. Based on 
the research of Allport, Postman, Rosnow, Knapp and others, an authoritarian state seems 
to be the perfect environment for the incubation and spread of rumors and conspiracy 
theories. Daniel Pipes, in his book The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy, 
writes about how people who live in an authoritarian state might tend to project their way 
of looking at things onto other regions of the world.179  A citizen of Iran, therefore, might 
174 Gray, Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World, 118. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid., 119. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Daniel Pipes, The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1998), 356–358. 
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believe that the leaders and media in the United States operate in exactly the same 
fashion as they do in Iran. The concept of projection might be one possible explanation 
for the prevalence of conspiracy theories in the social media data collected for this thesis. 
It also might be one possible explanation for the connection between PressTV and 
American analysts, and contributors whose input often seems to include conspiracy 
theories.  
Transnational actors also serve as a source of Middle Eastern conspiracy 
theories.180  International news outlets, such as Al Jazeera, and leaders of extremist non-
state groups, such as Osama bin Laden, are examples of such transnational actors.181  
Appealing to what the people in the region want to hear, transnational actors can use 
conspiracy theories for “legitimacy construction.”182 Transnational actors can use 
conspiracy theories to challenge the state and can garner support across state boundaries. 
In this effort, they are greatly aided by the Internet and globalization— forces that can 
overcome a state control of mass media.183 The wide circulation of the media products of 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), provides an excellent example of how the Internet allows a transnational actor to 
overcome the state monopoly of mass media.184 In fact, ISIS has been so successful in 
this endeavor that it has largely overtaken the similar efforts of another transnational 
extremist group, al Qaeda.185 
In summary, conspiracy theories are prevalent in the Middle East and Iran. 
Factors that contribute to this phenomenon include historical marginalization and 
frustration, the effects of most of the region being controlled by authoritarian states, the 
180 Gray, Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World, 167. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Brigitte L. Nacos, “Al-Qaeda’s Propaganda Advantage and How to Counter It,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism, 2007, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/14/html. 
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use of conspiracies as a tool for transnational actors, anxiety, uncertainty and perhaps 
even child-rearing practices. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION, RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
The collection and subsequent analysis of this social media data was undertaken 
in an attempt to answer the following research questions: 
• What is the strategy behind Iran’s English-language media campaigns on 
the Internet, particularly with regard to Iran’s use of social media? 
• What is the significance of that strategy for American security? 
Another important research question that arose during the data collection process 
(and that shaped a great deal of the content of this thesis) is: 
• Why are conspiracy theories featured prominently in Iranian English-
language Internet sites? 
The thrust of this research is a qualitative analysis of Iranian English-language 
Internet sites, particularly with regard to social media.   
Similarweb.com186 was used as the source of statistics for this comparison. The 
Similarweb.com statistics are presented in a user-friendly format and its statistical 
categories were useful as analytical tools for this study.    
A 2013 article from the United States Institute of Peace’s “Iran Primer”187 was 
used to obtain a listing of prominent English-language Iranian news websites. 
Similarweb’s statistics for those websites were evaluated to find the three most popular of 
these sites in the United States: the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA),188 the Young 
186 “Website Traffic & Mobile App Analytics,” SimilarWeb, accessed October 2, 2014, 
http://www.similarweb.com/. 
187 Helia Ighani and Nada Garrett, “Iran’s Message: Now in English Too,” United States Institute of 
Peace, March 6, 2013, http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2013/mar/06/iran%E2%80%99s-message-now-
english-too. 
188 “خبرگزاری دانشجویان ایران - ایسنا,” (Iranian Students’ News Agency), accessed February 17, 
2015, http://isna.ir/en. 
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Journalist’s Club (YJC)189 and PressTV.190  Since all three sites have social media 
components, particularly on Facebook, they were acceptable for this study.   
A perusal of the data from Similarweb makes it possible to quickly identify some 
sharp differences between the top three sites. PressTV and ISNA get a small portion of 
their traffic from social media. In the case of PressTV, 9.56 percent of its August 2014 
traffic came from social media, with just over 86 percent of that traffic coming from 
Facebook.191  ISNA got 4.11 percent of its traffic from social media, with 57.62 percent 
of that traffic coming from Facebook.192 YJC, however, only got .43 percent of its traffic 
from social media, with 44.3 percent of that traffic coming from Facebook.193  Based on 
this data, it seems that YJC’s efforts on social media are less effective than the efforts of 
its top competitors. Choosing these three sites provides some interesting balance; ISNA is 
a reformist site,194 while YJC and PressTV are more conservative. PressTV, ISNA195 
and YJC196 all have Facebook pages, but the ISNA Facebook page only had two posts on 
its wall during the data-collection period of this thesis. PressTV has numerous pages on 
Facebook. This study will only look at the main PressTV Facebook page  
The top-referring sites to PressTV in August 2014 consists primarily of Western 
websites (see Figure 1, top left table).197  Some of these referring sites prominently 
feature conspiracy theory content, such as Rense.com, Davidicke.com and 
Whatreallyhappened.com. 
189 “باشگاه خبرنگاران,” (Young Journalists Club), accessed February 17, 2015, http://www.yjc.ir/. 
190 “PressTV,” PressTV, accessed February 17, 2015, http://www.presstv.com/. 
191 “Presstv.com Traffic Statistics,” SimilarWeb, accessed October 2, 2014, 
http://www.similarweb.com/website/presstv.com. 
192 “ISNA.ir Traffic Statistics,” SimilarWeb, accessed October 2, 2014, 
http://www.similarweb.com/website/isna.ir. 
193 “YJC.ir Traffic Statistics,” SimilarWeb, accessed October 2, 2014, 
http://www.similarweb.com/website/yjc.ir. 
194 Daniel Engber, “What’s the Iranian Students News Agency?,” Slate, February 2, 2006, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2006/02/whats_with_the_iranian_students_new
s_agency.html. 
195 “Iranian Students’ News Agency - ISNA,” Facebook. 
196 “YJC.ir,” Facebook. 
197 “Presstv.com Traffic Statistics by SimilarWeb.” 
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Figure 1.  Top left: PressTV, top right: YJC, bottom: ISNA198 
The lists of top referring sites to YJC and ISNA are quite different, consisting 
mostly of other Iranian news websites. One possible conclusion to draw from this is that 
YJC and ISNA receive a larger percentage of their readers from the Iranian population, 
living in Iran and abroad, than PressTV does. If this is true, then another logical 
conclusion would be that PressTV has a greater capability of reaching a non-Iranian, 
Western audience.   
198 Images from “Presstv.com Traffic Statistics,” SimilarWeb, accessed October 2, 2014, 
http://www.similarweb.com/website/presstv.com; “YJC.ir Traffic Statistics,” SimilarWeb, accessed 
October 2, 2014, http://www.similarweb.com/website/yjc.ir; “ISNA.ir Traffic Statistics,” SimilarWeb, 
accessed October 2, 2014, http://www.similarweb.com/website/isna.ir. 
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 Figure 2.  Listing of also visited websites by users of PressTV.com199 
The Similarweb category “also visited websites” is also illuminating. While YJC 
and ISNA viewers are also visiting other Iranian news sites, the PressTV listing (see 
Figure 2) shows that their viewers are often visiting sites that oppose, or challenge, 
Western views. Included in this list are the pro-Russian site Russia Today,200 the Hamas-
affiliated site Qassam,201 and the Hezbollah-affiliated site Al Manar.202  An outlier of 
sorts is the One American News Network.203  That site’s content is conservative and 
libertarian. Its content is not as overtly anti-American as is the content from some of the 
other listed sites.  
Facebook is currently the most popular and influential social media site in the  
world204  Facebook provides a very useful timeline feature that provides a chronological 
history of each of its pages. For these reasons, Facebook was the primary source of 
content review for this thesis.   
199 “Presstv.com Traffic Statistics,” SimilarWeb, accessed October 2, 2014, 
http://www.similarweb.com/website/presstv.com. 
200 “RT,” RT, accessed February 17, 2015, http://rt.com/. 
201 “Ezzedeen Al-Qassam Brigades’ Information Office,” Quassam, http://qassam.ps/. 
202 “موقع قناة المنار- لبنان,” (Channel Almanar Lebanon site), accessed February 17, 2015, 
http://almanar.com.lb/.  
203 “One America News Network,” OAN, One American News Network, accessed February 18, 2015, 
http://www.oann.com/. 
204 “Facebook.com Site Overview.” 
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Because of the limited time available for completion of this thesis, only three 
months of content were reviewed for analysis. The time period chosen for review was 
from April 2014 to June 2014. Coding of the content for qualitative analysis was an 
inductive process. An initial review of the content of the Facebook pages was sufficient 
to begin identifying attributes (best thought of as “talking points”) and themes that were 
used to create codes for future analysis. The lack of content on the ISNA page meant 
there was not enough material for useful analysis. However, the PressTV and YJC 
Facebook pages were rich in content and provided suitable material for analysis. 
My review of the content of the YJC Facebook page showed that the page 
features primarily visual content with short snippets of written content, often taking the 
form of political cartoons. I identified and tracked the sentiments contained in these 
social media posts, both positive and negative. I also identified and listed leaders and 
other figures that were featured in the posts, and tracked other significant visual and 
written elements in the posts. I determined and tracked the major theme of each post 
based on its sentiments and other content, and I identified and tracked evidence of 
significant propaganda techniques in each post. Additional elements, such as links to 
other websites or social media pages and the cartoonists who created some of the content, 
were also noted. Finally, I tracked the number of Facebook “likes” and “shares” for each 
post.  “Likes” can be seen as a relative measure of positive receptivity to the content, as 
well as a relative indicator of how many times the post has been viewed. A “share” is 
representative of the content’s penetration through the Facebook audience. Since the 
number of Facebook “comments” on YJC posts was so low, I did not track them.   
A review of the PressTV Facebook page showed that it features content that is 
more varied and in depth when compared to the content on the YJC page. The additional 
material in the sidebars and margins of the linked pages provided important material for 
analysis. The process of reviewing the video, audio and written content linked to each 
post was time-consuming, but important to obtain a more thorough understanding of the 
communication strategies used by PressTV. As with the content from the YJC page, I 
tracked negative and positive sentiments, as well as the leaders and other key figures that 
were featured in the posts. I also tracked other significant written or visual elements. I 
 37 
noted elements of the posts that demonstrated the use of propaganda techniques. Since 
conspiracy theory content was often featured, I created a separate listing for tracking that 
content. I also identified and tracked analysts or contributors to the PressTV stories. As 
with YJC, I tracked the “likes” and “shares” for PressTV’s posts. I also tracked the 
number of “comments” that each post received.  “Comments” can be considered as a 
relative measure of the engagement of PressTV’s audience. PressTV obviously has a 
much larger and more engaged audience in social media than YJC. The number of 
“likes,” “shares,” and “comments,” is significantly higher when compared to the numbers 
for YJC. 
The next chapter contains a more detailed look at the YJC and PressTV Facebook 
pages, based on the three months of data collected for this thesis. 
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II. AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED IRANIAN SOCIAL MEDIA 
PAGES 
A. AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE FACEBOOK PAGE FOR THE YOUNG 
JOURNALIST’S CLUB 
The Facebook page for the Young Journalist’s Club (YJC) focuses almost 
exclusively on visual content with only a small amount of English-language text added. 
An exception to this comes in the form of links to the official page for Iran’s Supreme 
Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. Links to Khamenei.ir, or to the Supreme Leader’s Twitter 
page, occurred in 11 percent of the posts between April 2014 and June 2014. In May 
2014, there were an exceptionally high number of these links—they occurred in 20 
percent of the month’s content. 
A full 43 percent of the posts for the study period consisted of cartoons. The 
cartoons are similar to U.S. political cartoons, but the cartoons posted on the YJC page 
tended to express negative sentiments toward Iran’s perceived enemies. The cartoons 
came from a variety of sources; about 13 percent of them had watermarks or other 
markings linking them to the FARS News Agency. 
The United States and Israel are often singled out for abuse on the YJC page. The 
percentage of YJC posts that express negative sentiments towards the United States and 
Israel showed a stunning consistency during the study period (see Figure 3). The rise in 
negative posts about  
Saudi Arabia in June demonstrates the YJC content creators’ ability to adapt to 
changes on the ground; in this case, it was a likely reaction to ISIS’s blitzkrieg-like 
advance into Iraq, which eventually led to ISIS control of a large part of that country, 
including the city of Mosul.205  During the same time period, just over one-third of YJC’s 
Facebook posts expressed negative sentiments toward the terrorist invaders. 
 




                                                 
 
Figure 3.  Chart created by the author showing percentage of posts containing negative sentiments for the months 
of April, May and June 2014209 
209 Data from “YJC.ir,” Facebook, accessed July 22, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club. 
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YJC posts also commonly featured, or alluded to, conspiracy theories. Twenty-
four percent of the posts from the study period were linked to conspiracy theories. 
Interestingly, 58 percent of those conspiracy-theory posts were posted in June, during the 
ISIS invasion of Iraq.   
 
Figure 4.  Image from YJC post210 
The YJC posts did not appear to be reaching a wide audience, nor did they 
penetrate deeply into the Facebook community. The month of May was particularly poor 
for the YJC page, with only one post garnering more than 30 likes and no posts at all 
garnering more than single-digit numbers of shares. The month of April was the most 
successful month for the page. During the three-month study period, the top five YJC 
posts, both in terms of likes and shares, came in April.   
The top post, using the measure of Facebook likes, was an image (see Figure 4) 
captioned, “the Last Encounter coming soon…”211  This picture garnered 80 likes and 28 
shares. 
This post fits well with the page’s often-expressed negative sentiments toward 
Israel. The picture suggests that, sometime in the near future, Iran will destroy Israel.  





                                                 
The second and third most popular posts were tied with 71 likes each. One of 
these posts contained images of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and American 
President Obama (see Figure 5, right side) wearing red-and-white checkered keffiyehs 
and was captioned, “Real Leaders of Wahhabism.”212  The red-and-white keffiyehs and 
the reference to “Wahhabism” serve to link the two leaders to a sect of Islam that is 
connected to Saudi Arabia.  Iranian propaganda also often links the Wahhabi movement 
to Sunni extremists. The real message behind this image was a conspiracy theory that 
claimed Israel and the United States were controlling the Wahhabi movement through the 
Saudi monarchy. The use of the keffiyeh also reminds the viewer of the Saudi 
involvement in the Wahhabi movement. This post was shared 32 times. 
 
Figure 5.  Images from two YJC posts. Left side: Putin humor; Right side: Real 
Leaders of Wahhabism213 
The other post that received 71 likes was a series of captioned photos (see Figure 
5, left side) featuring Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister 
212“YJC.ir - Timeline Photos,” Facebook, accessed April 18, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club/photos/a.447736721935851.106215.442351522474371/70818445255
7742/?type=1&relevant_count=1.  




                                                 
Netanyahu.214  The humorous point of the post is that Putin lied to Netanyahu and 
provided Syria with advanced surface-to-air missiles, despite Netanyahu’s objections. 
This post also showed Russia working with Syria to defeat Israeli interests in the region. 
The post was shared only 12 times. The YJC Facebook page frequently shows Russia and 
Syria, and their respective leaders, in a positive light.  
The fourth and fifth most popular posts on YJC each garnered 66 likes. One of 
these posts was a cartoon featuring what appears to be a European Union (EU) weapons 
inspector pointing at a small rocket embedded in the ground some distance away from an 
Israeli city.215  Meanwhile, a giant rocket, with a radioactive material symbol on it, has 
landed on a Palestinian city and caused great damage. Since the impact of this giant 
rocket is so obvious, the cartoonist gave the inspector black glasses and a white cane to 
show that the inspector is blind (see Figure 6, left side). This cartoon also illustrates a 
common theme appearing in media accounts of recent conflicts between Israel and its 
Palestinian neighbors and Gaza: the lack of proportionality in the Israeli response to 
aggressive acts coming out of Gaza or the Palestinian Territories. It was shared 46 times.   
The second post with 66 likes and 26 shares contains a gallery of photos of 
Western and Arab leaders who oppose Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad.216  These 
leaders all have a red “X” or a red “?” symbol over their pictures, indicating that they are 
no longer in their former leadership roles, or their future leadership roles are in question 
(see Figure 6, right side). Below the smaller pictures, there are larger images of a smiling 
Bashar al-Assad and a winking Russian President Putin. The caption, using poor English 
grammar, states, “They said, He will be gone in two weeks. They are all gone he still 
there and Putin.”  The theme here is that Syria and its Russian ally are still standing, 
triumphant over the Western powers and their allies in the Middle East. 
214 “YJC.ir - Timeline Photos,” Facebook, April 25, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club/photos/a.447736721935851.106215.442351522474371/71104125227
2062/?type=1&relevant_count=1. 
215 “YJC.ir - Timeline Photos,” Facebook, April 2, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club/photos/a.447736721935851.106215.442351522474371/70067185330
9002/?type=1&relevant_count=1. 




                                                 
Figure 6.  Images from two YJC posts217 
Overall, the data from the Facebook page for YJC shows that the page had only a 
small impact on Facebook’s vast English-language audience. The number of likes and 
shares are modest, never exceeding double-digits. The use of images and cartoons with 
little text seems significant. It might indicate that the YJC’s staff suffers from a lack of 
English-language skills. It is also possible that the choice of images with only a small 
amount of text was considered sufficient to convey the necessary meaning of the message 
in an easily digestible format for the average Facebook user. The frequent use of humor 
might have been intentional to elicit an emotional response and encourage users to share 
the joke with their Facebook friends. Other than links to Ayatollah Khamenei’s website 
and Twitter account, YJC’s Facebook page very rarely directed the reader to other 
locations on the Internet where the reader might be exposed to additional messaging.    
The links provided to Ayatollah Khamenei’s website and Twitter account are an 
indicator that the creators of YJC content were strongly supportive of the Supreme 
Leader and his allies in the Iranian political scene. The more moderate camp in Iran is 
currently represented by President Rouhani.218   
217 YJC.ir - Timeline Photos,” Facebook, accessed July 22, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club/photos/a.447736721935851.106215.442351522474371/70067185330
9002/?type=1&relevant_count=1; “YJC.ir - Timeline Photos,” Facebook, accessed July 22, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club/photos/a.447736721935851.106215.442351522474371/70067235330
8952/?type=1&relevant_count=1. 
218 Geneive Abdo, “The End of Rouhani’s Honeymoon,”  Al Jazeera America, February 18, 2014, 
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/2/hassan-rouhani-iranalikhameneinuclearnegotiations.html. 
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Rouhani is in favor of the current round of nuclear negotiations with the West, 
and he seems to be attempting to improve relations between Iran and the United States 
and its allies. YJC does not seem supportive of Rouhani’s efforts. For example, a link 
from Khamenei.ir was posted that gave details from the Ayatollah’s statement from April 
9, 2014, when he asserted that “no one has the right to trade nuclear achievements and no 
one will do this.”219  Another post featured an abusive ad hominem attack on the UK’s 
Catherine Ashton, who was a negotiator in the P5+1 talks.220  Yet another post featured a 
cartoon showing Uncle Sam speaking to a crowd and lecturing them about not building 
bombs, while he held a nuclear bomb in his jacket pocket.221  Finally, there was a cartoon 
showing the hand of the “Iranian nation” pushing back a negotiating table that the United 
States, UK, EU, and Israel’s representatives were trying to push over a red line.222  The 
red line was most likely intended as a humorous jab at President Obama’s supposed red 
line against Syrian chemical weapons use. Adding Israel—a nation that is not part of the 
P5+1 negotiation— into the cartoon fuels the conspiracy that Israel has some amount of 
control over the Western powers. Of course, YJC’s almost constant negative messaging 
against the United States and its allies certainly did not help any moderate Iranian efforts 
toward improving relations with those countries.  
B. AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE FACEBOOK PAGE FOR PRESSTV  
The Facebook pages for PressTV and YJC display some similarities in that they 
both treat the United States and Israel in a negative manner. The percentage of PressTV 
posts that expressed negative sentiments toward the United States and Israel showed 
219 “Khamenei.ir - Timeline Photos | Facebook,” April 13, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/www.Khamenei.ir/photos/a.415551031851170.95270.415541435185463/63968
7252770879/?type=1&relevant_count=1. 
220 “YJC.ir - Timeline Photos,” Facebook, April 15, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club/photos/a.447736721935851.106215.442351522474371/70644152606
5368/?type=1&relevant_count=1. 
221 Firoozi, “YJC.ir - Timeline Photos,” Facebook, April 25, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club/photos/a.447736721935851.106215.442351522474371/72586821412
2699/?type=1&relevant_count=1. 




                                                 
reasonable consistency during the study period (see Figure 7). However, the negative 
content was not as overtly evident on the PressTV page, nor was the percentage of 
negative posts as high as the YJC page’s. The number of monthly posts containing 
negative sentiments toward the United States was between 35 and 43 percent on the 
PressTV page but more than 50 percent (on average) on the YJC page. The number of 
monthly posts containing negative sentiment toward Israel fluctuated between 9 and 17 




Figure 7.  Chart created by the author showing percentage of posts containing negative sentiments for the months 
of April, May and June 2014223 
223  Data from “Press TV - Tehran, Iran - Media/News/Publishing,” Facebook, accessed August 11, 2014, https://www.facebook.com/PRESSTV.  
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As with YJC’s page, PressTV’s Facebook page demonstrated its creators’ abilities 
to adapt its message to changes on the ground, which resulted from the rapid advances by 
ISIS into Iraq, evidenced by June’s large increase in negative sentiments toward 
militants, ISIS, takfiris, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The use of the term takfiri when 
referring to militant groups such as ISIS is particularly significant. In Islam, to refer to 
another Muslim as takfir is to state that the Muslim is guilty of apostasy: an act of 
renouncing one’s Muslim faith. Salafist groups such as ISIS have taken it upon 
themselves to declare other Muslim groups as apostates—a practice that opposes the 
orthodox tradition that reserves such declarations to Muslim legal scholars, the ulema. 
Therefore, branding militants such as ISIS as takfiri Muslims has a powerful negative 
connotation. PressTV’s persistent use of the takfiri term when referring to ISIS might be 
seen as a good indication of a tightly coordinated messaging strategy. Repeating a key 
word or phrase is common in advertising, as well as in propaganda.224  In this case, the 
repetitive usage of the term takfiri also tells us something about the message’s target 
audience. An average American or other English-speaking citizen in the West is not 
likely to be familiar with the term takfiri, but an English-speaking Muslim is very likely 
to understand the term.    
PressTV’s page had a much greater effect on the Facebook audience than YJC’s 
page does. As of October 2014, the PressTV Facebook page had garnered over 1.6 
million likes, compared to only just over 5.6 thousand likes for the YJC Facebook page. 
During the study period, posts on PressTV’s Facebook page often received over 500 
likes, and many times exceeded 1,000 likes. YJC’s posts for the same period never 
exceeded double digits. PressTV’s audience also seemed to be more engaged than YJC’s 
audience, demonstrated by PressTV’s posts often generating triple-digit numbers of 
comments. YJC readers rarely commented on YJC’s posts. PressTV also achieved greater 
penetration into the Facebook community, as evidenced by the number of shares its posts 
received. PressTV’s number of shares often reached triple digits, whereas not one YJC 
post during the study period exceeded double digits.   
224 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 396. 
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The PressTV page tried very hard to maintain the appearance of a standard news 
site. There were no cartoons. The Facebook posts were typically focused on the Middle 
East, although other areas of the world also received coverage. For example, during the 
study period, there were numerous articles about the recent crisis in Ukraine, as well as 
coverage of the violence in the Central African Republic. News that put the United States 
in a bad light, such as the May 2014 shooting rampage in Santa Barbara, California, was 
also covered. News coverage favorable to Russia and China was also featured. The 
PressTV content often illustrated Russian and Chinese ties with Iran and showed how 
these nations stood together in opposition to the United States and its European allies.   
PressTV’s staff seemed savvier than YJC’s staff in their use of social media; they 
effectively utilized hashtags and utilized links to drive Facebook viewers to their website. 
YJC had a link to their website on their Facebook page, but not in their posts. YJC 
readers would more often be exposed to links or the website address for Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s website.   
During the study period, PressTV Facebook posts used hashtags more often than 
YJC posts. Hashtags group posts that use the same tag and facilitate an Internet search for 
the tagged posts..   
PressTV also used links on their Facebook posts to direct readers to their website, 
PressTV.ir. On that site, the audience was treated to a larger version of the article, along 
with links to additional news stories and photos. Frequently, there was video content to 
supplement the written article. The videos were very similar in style and appearance to 
most Western news programs—the stories typically are narrated by hosts, sometimes 
with guests in the studio or on a video feed. The studio contains official logos and news 
desks and the hosts speak in English. Video and photo images related to the story are also 
featured. There are also links to related stories, interviews and viewpoints, selected by 
PressTV’s staff. The related stories, interviews and viewpoints frequently seemed to 
demonstrate PressTV’s editorial slant.   
For example, on June 13, 2014, the PressTV Facebook page contained a link to an 
article on PressTV.ir titled, “UN human rights chief alarmed by Iraq extrajudicial 
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killings.”225  The article dealt with concern over extrajudicial killings and summary 
executions of prisoners and civilians in Iraq by ISIS. The related stories, interviews and 
viewpoints linked on that page could be taken to indicate that PressTV’s staff believed 
that the United States and Zionists were also responsible for those crimes, or at least they 
might have wanted their viewers to see things that way. The related interviews on the 
page were titled, “US responsible for ISIL terror in Iraq” and “US responsible for crisis in 
Iraq.”  The related viewpoint article was titled, “US silence on ISIL offensive dubious.”  
One of the related stories was titled “ISIL Takfiris, tools of Zionists.”  This is an 
excellent example of framing the message to lead an audience to an interpretation desired 
by the message’s creator. Framing can have an impact on audience judgments and 
socially shared principles.226  It is not hard to imagine how reading this additional 
content might shape the reader’s opinion more to Iran’s liking.   
The articles on the PressTV were also accompanied by the website’s current poll 
question. The poll question changes at least once a month. If you look at an article in one 
month and then look at the same article the next month, the poll questions will likely be 
different. The subject matter of the poll question and the answer choices are also 
excellent examples of message framing. For example, the poll question in October 2014 
was, “What do you think is behind the Ebola hysteria?”  The answer choices were: 
• The U.S. is using the Ebola media hype and fear to boost its military 
presence in West Africa. 
• American pharmaceutical companies are behind the hysteria while seeking 
to develop and sell anti-Ebola drugs. 
• Items 1 and 2 
• Because Ebola is a very dangerous disease that poses a serious threat to 
human race. 
225 “UN Human Rights Chief Alarmed by Iraq Extrajudicial Killings,” PressTV, June 13, 2014, 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/06/13/366803/un-alarmed-by-militant-killings-in-iraq/. 
226 Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 190. 
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The poll question answers provided framing to suggest that there was a 
conspiracy by the American government or American companies to capitalize on the 
Ebola outbreak’s hype and fear for imperialist or economic gains.   
PressTV also used an interesting cadre of analysts and experts to deliver editorial 
content. That content was often rich in conspiracy theories; this topic will be further 
explored in a later chapter of this thesis.    
One of the recurring shows on PressTV is titled “The Debate.”  The show airs on 
the website each day at 1835 GMT and the PressTV Facebook page will often contain a 
short introduction to the content to be covered on the show that day. The Facebook post 
will include a series of questions to go along with that introduction. The questions are 
typically leading; they often seem structured to tell the reader how to think about certain 
issues.   For example, on May 4, 2014, the PressTV Facebook page featured a post about 
violence against Muslims in India, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and the Central African 
Republic.227  This post was a lead for that night’s episode of “The Debate.”  The post 
concluded with the following questions: 
• Why isn’t the UN doing enough to counter persecution against Muslims in 
those countries?  
• Who is responsible for the Muslim cleansing? The governments or the 
world body?  
• Where are the rights advocates?  
• Are there organized killings underway?  
• Who are financing the perpetrators? 
The framing in this series of questions was designed to lead the reader to the 
conclusion that the UN and various “rights advocates” had an agenda behind their lack 
inadequate response to the violence against Muslims. It also implied that there were other 
governments and financiers behind the violence. Furthermore, the questions indicated 




                                                 
that the violence was not random, but was rather a “Muslim cleansing.”  This is a 
particular nasty phrase, since it is easy for a reader to associate with the term “ethnic 
cleansing,” which was used to describe horrific acts of savagery in many recent conflicts, 
such as the Bosnian War or the Rwandan genocide. Mass media outlets reported heavily 
on the forced deportations, murders and rapes of civilians that were commonplace during 
that conflict. Mentally recalling those images makes it easier for a person to assign a 
higher risk for a similar reoccurrence. Psychologists refer to this mental shortcut as the 
availability heuristic.228  PressTV’s use of the term “Muslim cleansing” took advantage 
of that mental shortcut and gave their audience reason to believe that a worldwide 
“Muslim cleansing” effort was plausible. This also elicits strong negative emotions from 
the audience.   
Playing on negative emotions is a useful technique for messaging, since it takes 
advantage of human psychological tendencies. Human beings will tend to give more 
weight to negative information about a person or organization than they would positive 
information.229  It is for this reason that negative campaign ads are prevalent during 
political campaigns. Negative events also produce disproportionate levels of public 
distrust.230  The previous example associated the UN and governments and rights 
activists with a weak response to very negative events, described powerfully as 
worldwide examples of “Muslim cleansing.”  The PressTV post capitalized on the 
negativity bias; this post was one of the most popular PressTV Facebook posts during the 
study period, with 2,027 likes. The audience was heavily engaged as well, adding 666 
comments to the post. In fact, other than posts in June related to the worldwide 
celebration of Ramadan or coverage of the soccer World Cup in Brazil, this was the top 
post for the study period. The coverage of the Ramadan festivities and the World Cup 
were outliers in this study, and not very useful when evaluating PressTV’s overall 
228 James N. Breckenridge and Philip G. Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of 
Mass-Mediated Fear,” Psychology of Terrorism, 2007, 121. 
229 Hara Estroff Marano, “Our Brain’s Negative Bias,” Psychology Today, June 20, 2003, 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/200306/our-brains-negative-bias. 
230 Breckenridge and Zimbardo, “The Strategy of Terrorism and the Psychology of Mass-Mediated 
Fear,” 122. 
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messaging strategy; therefore they were not included in the listing of the top five posts 
for the study period.   
The second most popular post during the study period was similar in structure and 
subject matter to the top post. The post was a lead into “The Debate” and dealt with 
Christian militias attacking Muslims in the Central African Republic; it was accompanied 
by an image of an African male, armed with a knife, chasing another man.231  The 
questions at the end of the post were another fine demonstration of framing: 
• Why aren’t foreign troops doing enough to stop the violence? 
• Is what happened in Rwanda 20 years ago is being (sic) repeated in the 
Central African Republic? 
• Why the (sic) international community is not taking action against the 
ethnic cleansing of Muslims? 
Once again, there was a reference to ethnic cleansing. The linkage to Rwanda was 
also an effective use of the availability heuristic, owing to the large amount of media 
coverage the Rwanda genocide received in 1994. The questions also implied a 
conspiracy: there was a conclusion that foreign troops and the international community 
were not doing enough or not taking action against the ethnic cleansing. This post 
received 1,643 likes, 641 comments and 1,144 shares.   
A major problem with the PressTV framing of this debate is that it was one sided. 
There was no mention of the war crimes and violence committed by the predominantly 
Muslim Seleka minority that, in a coup supported by mercenaries from Chad and the 
Sudan, had previously taken over the government of the Central African Republic . 
France, the UN and the African Union intervened in an unsuccessful effort to stop the 
violence, but a ceasefire of sorts was achieved.232  It is easy to criticize their efforts; their 
231 “Press TV - Timeline Photos,” Facebook, April 18, 2014, 
https://www.facebook.com/PRESSTV/photos/a.352265081481952.72927.145097112198751/70435238293
9885/?type=1&relevant_count=1. 
232 Ibid., “Central African Republic: How a Once Peaceful Nation Descended into a Brutal Civil 




                                                 
lack of success might be turned into a conspiracy through twisted logic, but it is hard to 
imagine how they could have achieved more in a country roiling with a religion-fueled 
cycle of violence, all set against a backdrop of poverty.   
The third most popular post dealt with Ayatollah Khamenei’s take on 
geopolitics.233  Once again, this post was a lead for “The Debate.”  Khamenei asserted 
that the United States had divided the world into three groups: an obedient group; a 
second group that does not obey, but should be tolerated; and a third disobedient group 
that does not obey the United States. According to Khamenei, the third group will not 
give in to, nor will it be blackmailed by, America. Khamenei noted that the first group 
includes dictatorial regimes, such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, for a time when it serves 
American interests. However, Khamenei added that the second group, which includes the 
European nations, has made the mistake of going along with the United States, but that 
the United States will stab them in the back at an opportune moment. Of course, Iran is in 
the disobedient group, standing against American interests. It is hard to disagree with 
some of Khamenei’s logic. The United States has supported dictatorial regimes when it 
suits American interests. However, Iran and other nations frequently do the same. Syria’s 
Assad and Libya’s Qaddafi immediately spring to mind. Linking the United States to 
dictatorial regimes, such as the regime of Saddam Hussein, connects the United States to 
something that is almost uniformly seen as negative, and that makes effective use, once 
again, of the negativity bias. Saddam’s Iraq is also a useful example, since it highlights a 
case in which an American friend ended up being overthrown by the United States. This 
example was used as a warning by Khamenei to America’s European allies, in an effort 
to create a wedge-driving conspiracy theory that America is waiting for an opportune 
moment to stab its European allies in the back. As with previous posts leading  into “The 
Debate,” this post concluded with questions for the reader: 
1. What do you think about the U.S. foreign policy? 
2. Why does it support despotic regimes that are subservient to the US? 




                                                 
3. Ayatollah Khamenei says European countries have made a big strategic 
blunder by serving America which is against their national interests. What 
do you think about the US-EU ties? 
Of course, with Khamenei’s statements leading up to the questions, the reader has 
already been told how to answer those questions. This post garnered 1,641 likes and 351 
comments and it was shared 446 times.   
The fourth most popular post for the study period amassed 1,576 likes and 177 
comments. This post, which consisted only of a captioned photo, was shared an 
impressive 4,524 times (see Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8.  Image of a cover photo from PressTV, April 27, 2014234 




                                                 
The photo showed a woman clinging to a lone olive tree. The woman’s face is 
distraught and, in the background, there is a jeep with a soldier seated in the driver’s seat. 
The caption for the posted photo read, “An elderly Palestinian woman trying to save her 
last olive tree as Israeli soldiers continue to occupy her land.”  This was posted as the 
cover photo for PressTV’s Facebook page on April 27, 2014. The use of such an 
emotional image was a powerfully persuasive tool. The image acts, through its visual 
presence, as evidence to back up the claim contained in the written caption.235  The 
elderly woman’s grief, coupled with the image of her desperately clinging to the tree, 
arouses feelings of pity and perhaps even rage against the soldiers who, as suggested by 
the text, are present to cut down the tree. Perhaps the viewer, who has been exposed to 
media reports about the region, understands that olive trees provide food and economic 
support for the Palestinian people. If so, then that exposure would make this image even 
more powerful. An emotional image such as this takes advantage of the reflexive nature 
of heuristic processing built into our brains over years of evolution.236  The visual 
evidence leads to mental shortcuts, or a snap judgment, rather than a careful analysis of 
the actual situation on the ground.237   
Many reports about the destruction of Palestinian olive trees attribute the damage 
to Israeli settlers and not the military. In fact, this photo seems to be from an event in 
2005, rather than 2014 (see Figure 9).238   
235 Charles A. Hill, “The Psychology of Rhetorical Images,” Defining Visual Rhetorics, 2004, 25–40. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Abed Omar Qusini, “A Palestinian Woman Carries a Branch from a Destroyed Olive Tree as 
Israeli Border Police Officers Watch,” American IIntifada, November 27, 2005, 
http://www.americanintifada.com/photos10/11-27.htm. 
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Figure 9.  Image from American Intifada239 
In 2005, the report stated that the olive trees had been damaged by Israeli settlers, 
not by the Israeli military as suggested by PressTV’s use of the photo in 2014. The 
PressTV photo was also truncated; we can’t see the entire tree. From another Internet 
source, the damaged tree in its entirety can be seen (see Figure 10).240  The tree in that 
photo already appears to be missing most of its upper foliage and branches, which are 
piled near the tree, and are visible in both the truncated and the more complete photo.   
239 Ibid. 
240 Megan Perry, “Bethlehem: ‘No Matter How Many Olive Trees They Destroy, We Will Plant 




                                                 
 
Figure 10.  Image from Ecologist241 
From the additional photo evidence, the woman in the photo is not trying to save 
the tree, but rather is lamenting the damage done to the tree. If the damage were done by 
settlers in 2005, it is still disturbing and, if true, an event worthy of condemnation. 
However, PressTV’s use of a nine-year-old photo as evidence of an injustice by the 
Israeli army in 2014 is rather disingenuous. Nevertheless, the use of this emotional image 
seems to have had its desired effect. The image was shared a relatively large number of 
times, spreading through the Facebook community.     
The fifth most popular post generated 1,574 likes, 304 comments, and was shared 
585 times. The post referred to a statement by Ayatollah Khamenei about recent conflicts 
between Muslims.242  Khamenei indicated that the “arrogant powers” were fomenting the 
241  Ibid. 




                                                 
conflict to cover up their own problems and generate fears of Iran and Shia Muslims to 
protect Israel.243  The Supreme Leader went on to condemn the Boko Haram militants as 
“takfiri” for kidnapping school girls in Nigeria. Khamenei encouraged Muslim unity and 
added that the “enemies of Islam have been trying to suppress Islamic awakening, but 
that they will eventually fail to do so.”244  The “arrogant powers” were not named, but 
were likely the United States and its allies in the Middle East. Conspiracy theory was also 
a factor in this post. In this case, the conspiracy was that the Sunni-Shia divide and 
criticism of Islam was actually a diversion to protect Israel and cover up the difficulties 
faced by the “enemies of Islam.”  There was no evidence presented to support the 
conspiracy. However, it might not have been necessary for Khamenei to present any 
evidence.   
PressTV’s staff likely knows their audience and frames their messaging 
accordingly. Israel and the United States are the “out-group” for PressTV’s audience. The 
study data supported that assertion. Referring back to the graph in Figure 7, negative 
sentiments against the United States and Israel were quite prevalent in PressTV’s social 
media messaging. According to the Sigmund Freud’s displacement theory, a group leader 
can turn negative sentiments to a target outside the group.245  In this case, Israel and the 
“arrogant powers” were the convenient scapegoats used by Khamenei to deflect the in-
group’s anger, which was generated by strife within the Islamic community. 
Although this post did not seem to be a lead for “The Debate,” it concluded with similar 
leading questions: 
• What do you think are the threats that the Muslim world is facing? 
• Why do conspirers want to cause conflict among Muslims? 
• Who will benefit from a divided Muslim community? 
• How Muslims have been reacting to divisive attempts? 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Fathali M. Moghaddam, From the Terrorists’ Point of View: What They Experience and Why They 
Come to Destroy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006), 16. 
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The questions reinforced the framing in the post, inferring that divisions in, and 
threats to, the Muslim community were the acts of “conspirers.” 
PressTV’s Facebook page certainly seemed more effective than its YJC 
counterpart. The proof is in the statistics provided by Facebook. PressTV’s posts received 
a much larger number of likes, and this is a reflection of a much larger audience. 
PressTV’s audience was also more engaged, as evidenced by the large number of 
comments on their posts. The relatively large number of shares also indicates that 
PressTV’s message was penetrating deeper into the Facebook community.   
PressTV’s content contained more than simple cartoons and short amounts of 
text; it contained complete news articles, videos and photo sets. The content was 
carefully structured to enhance its impact on its target audience. It took advantage of 
message framing and other techniques that reflect the value of understanding group and 
individual psychology when crafting a messaging strategy. PressTV also has a strong tie 
to conspiracy theories and to persons in the West who are spreading those theories. This 
will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter. PressTV effectively used links to drive 
readers to their more immersive website, which contained links to more content 
supportive of their narrative. PressTV has also been working on expanding its social 
media effort, with links to their Twitter and YouTube pages, as well as mobile Apps 
designed to reach an audience that is either on the go, or might only be able to access the 
Internet through smartphones and similar devices. Overall, when compared to YJC, 
PressTV seems to have a much better understanding of how to effectively use Facebook. 
C. WHAT DO THE IRANIAN LEADERS SAY?  
Recently, there has been talk in the Western media about a struggle in Iran over 
the nuclear negotiations with the West. In one camp are the moderates, led by the Iranian 
President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.   Rouhani and 
Zarif seek to craft a deal that preserves the Iranian nuclear program, but gets crushing 
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sanctions lifted.246  Although it is possible that Rouhani and Zarif are merely hiding their 
real motives and views, the friction in Iran between the moderates and the hardliners 
would seem to indicate otherwise.247  In the other camp are the conservative hardliners, 
who support the stance taken by Rouhani’s predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The 
conservatives are concerned that the moderates will give away too much to get sanctions 
lifted and do not want to compromise with the West about Iran’s nuclear program.248  
Khamenei seems to share their views, but early on he did provide some support for his 
negotiators’ mission, even if he did not view their chances of success with much 
optimism.249  The conservatives seem to possess the ultimate trump card, since the 
Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, is in their camp; any deal made by 
Rouhani and Zarif would have to get his stamp of approval.250  The coverage from 
PressTV and YJC shows that they understand that reality.    
The data collected for this study showed that YJC was largely supportive of 
Khamenei and the conservatives. During the three-month study period, not a single post 
mentioned Rouhani or Zarif, but Khamenei was linked to 30 posts, often accompanied by 
a link to his official website. The data for PressTV showed a more balanced approach, 
with only six Facebook posts linked to Khamenei and a total of five posts mentioning 
Zarif or Rouhani.   
However, the number of times a leader is mentioned by a social media outlet is 
not the only measure of the leader’s support. Another useful method is to compare the 
leader’s statements to the actual content on the social media outlet’s page.      
246 Ramin Mostaghim and Patrick J. McDonnell, “Hassan Rouhani Clashes with Iranian Conservatives 




249 Thomas Erdbrink and Jodi Rudoren, “Iran’s Top Leader and U.S. Counter Criticism of Talks,” 
New York Times, November 3, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/world/middleeast/irans-top-
leader-and-us-counter-criticism-of-talks.html?_r=0. 
250 “Saving the Nuclear Deal With Iran,” New York Times, January 10, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/opinion/sunday/saving-the-nuclear-deal-with-iran.html?_r=0. 
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One key difference between the moderate camp led by Rouhani and the hardline 
camp led by Khamenei is their use of loaded language. Rouhani and Zarif are seeking a 
diplomatic agreement on the nuclear issue and they are careful to avoid harsh rhetoric 
that might shut down or hamper negotiations. Rouhani does not use strident or overly 
critical language when he refers to Iran’s relations with the United States,251 and he 
typically avoids the using words such as Zionist when he refers to Israel.252  On the other 
hand, Ayatollah Khamenei’s rhetoric is often severe and abrasive. For example, 
Khamenei made negative references to the Zionists in speeches he gave to government 
officials and ambassadors from Islamic countries,253 to his own people at the Khomeini 
Shrine254 and to students at the Iranian Imam Hussein University.255  When Khamenei 
refers to the United States and its allies, he often uses the insulting term “arrogant 
powers.”  Examples of this can be found in Khamenei’s speeches given to the Iranian 
Assembly of Experts,256 government officials and ambassadors from Islamic countries257 
and Imam Hussein University.258  
When reviewing the YJC’s posts during the study period, the YJC’s editorial slant 
appeared in line with Khamenei and the hardliners. The frequent quotes and posts from 
Khamenei’s own website made the linkage obvious. Furthermore, YJC often featured 
cartoons that used negative imagery and slogans in reference to America and its allies 
(especially Israel), and the leaders of those countries.   
251 “President in a Live TV Interview: Iran Is Ready to Negotiate with the World Logically,” Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s Presidency, April 30, 2014, http://www.president.ir/en/77147. 
252 “Dr.Rouhani in a Phone Call with Qatari Emir: Terrorists Should Know Gone Is Era of Genocide, 
Terrorism,” Islamic Republic of Iran’s Presidency, June 29, 2014, http://www.president.ir/en/78976. 
253 “ Supreme Leader’s Speech in Meeting with Government Officials and Ambassadors of Islamic 
Countries,” Khamenei.ir, May 27, 2014, 
http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1917&Itemid=4. 
254 “ Supreme Leader’s Speech on 25th Demise Anniversary of Imam Khomeini (r.a.),” Khamenei.ir, 
June 6, 2014, http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1921&Itemid=4. 
255 “Supreme Leader’s Speech at Imam Hussein (a.s.) University,” Khamenei.ir, accessed January 11, 
2015, http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1913&Itemid=4. 
256 “Supreme Leader’s Speech in Meeting with Members of Assembly of Experts,” Khamenei.ir, 
March 6, 2014, 
http://english.khamenei.ir//index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1881&Itemid=4. 
257 “Supreme Leader’s Speech in Meeting with Government Officials.” 
258 “Supreme Leader’s Speech at Imam Hussein (a.s.) University.” 
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PressTV’s posts typically avoided similar abusive visual content. On the key 
issues, PressTV deferred to Khamenei’s views and the conservative camp. An example of 
this can be found in the posts during the study period that referred to Iran’s nuclear 
program. In April, PressTV posted a statement made by Khamenei in which he asserted 
that Iran’s nuclear development and research activities would not stop, and that Iran’s 
negotiators would have to resist the “bullying from the other [negotiating] party.”259  In 
the statement, Khamenei asserted that Iran’s nuclear research was for peaceful 
purposes.260  During the study period, only one Facebook post mentioned Zarif when 
dealing with the nuclear negotiations. Although that post indicated that Zarif believed an 
agreement would be reached, the focus of the post was more in line with Khamenei’s 
earlier statement and indicated that Iran would not acquiesce to Western demands, and 
that it would continue operations at its Arak heavy water plant.261  Once again, the 
Iranians stated that the Arak plant was in operation to provide radioisotopes to treat 
cancer patients, and not for nuclear weapons.262  Another piece of evidence pointing 
toward PressTV’s editorial slant was discussed in more detail previously—the links on 
PressTV’s Facebook page pointed readers to a more detailed version of the story on their 
website. Once on the PressTV website, the related stories, interviews and viewpoints 
were often critical of the United States and its allies. However, the best evidence for 
PressTV’s editorial slant came from its choice of analysts and contributors; they often 
used abusive language in their work. If PressTV sought to further the efforts of Rouhani’s 
moderate camp, that kind of content would likely have been reduced, suppressed or 
eliminated.   









                                                 
Iran’s government is a theocracy; it is designed to give the Supreme Leader the 
ultimate authority in most important policy matters.263  Because the Supreme Leader 
wields so much power, the Iranian government might be viewed as a dictatorship. In a 
dictatorship, there is more tolerance for criticism among the people than there is for 
criticism among the elite ruling class.264  The ruling class will therefore obediently 
conform to the leader’s stance on the key issues. This consistency in message makes it 
easier to control the masses. During negotiations, Rouhani might be able to set himself 
apart from Khamenei by avoiding certain topics and eschewing strident language, but he 
cannot, for example, use pro-American language. Similarly, media outlets, especially 
those that seem to be sanctioned by the Iranian government, will not take stances that are 
critical of their country’s leadership. Since the elite, both inside and outside Iran, have 
relatively open access to the Internet, they will also receive an ideological “boost” from 
the Iranian media campaign.   
In the United States, there will likely also be a great deal of opposition to an 
agreement that relaxes the sanctions against Iran without a real brake placed on Iran’s 
nuclear program.265 When coupled with the Iranian situation discussed previously, it is 
hard to imagine there will be any meaningful change in the relations between Iran and the 
West.  
The next chapter will explore the inclusion of conspiracy theories in selected 
Iranian social media pages. 
  
263 “Politics in Iran,” Iran Matters, accessed January 12, 2015, 
http://iranmatters.belfercenter.org/politics-iran. 
264 Fathali M. Moghaddam, The Psychology of Dictatorship (Washington, DC: American 
Psychological Association, 2013), 119–120. 
265 “Saving the Nuclear Deal With Iran,” New York Times. 
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III. CONSPIRACY THEORIES IN SELECTED IRANIAN SOCIAL 
MEDIA PAGES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A theme that emerged from analyzing the PressTV and YJC Facebook pages was 
a tendency to give significant attention to conspiracy theories. Approximately 24 percent 
of the YJC posts and 32 percent of the PressTV posts during the study period contained, 
or were suggestive of, a conspiracy theory. To thoroughly understand this prevalence, a 
substantial portion of this thesis is devoted to its examination. 
B. YJC.IR AND CONSPIRACY THEORIES 
In June 2014, nearly half of the posts on YJC’s Facebook page involved 
conspiracy theories. This represented a marked departure from the numbers for April and 
May, when conspiracy theory content accounted for only 12–16 percent of the posts. As 
discussed earlier, regional events in June were important to Iran, because of ISIS’s 
successful invasion of a large portion of Iraq. It seems logical that YJC’s staff felt 
compelled to explain this change of fortunes in the region and, as evidenced by the 
content of the posts, conspiracy theories were a large part of that explanation. A veritable 
smorgasbord of conspiracy theories was proposed in the June posts. The United States 
was the top villain in these conspiracies, but other regional actors were not disregarded; 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Kuwait, Qatar and Israel were also featured in the conspiracy 
theories. Some of the posts also hinted at media complicity in the conspiracy, including 
several posts portraying the World Cup coverage as a distraction from events in Iraq. 
Other conspiracy posts reminded readers of earlier popular conspiracy themes, such as 
the 9/11 attacks as an “inside job” and the ongoing role of the illuminati in conspiracies. 
These posts could be seen as attempts to establish resonance with an audience that 
already accepted early popular conspiracy theories.266  Establishing common ground in 
266 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, “How to Analyze Propaganda,” Propaganda and 
Persuasion (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2011). 
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this manner paves the way for future messages containing conspiracy theory content. It is 
also indicative of at least one segment of YJC’s target audience.    
The prevalence of posts dealing with the ISIS invasion of Iraq is not surprising. 
The rise of ISIS was a big story worldwide, particularly in American media. However, 
why did YJC place so much emphasis on conspiracy theories?  One possible explanation 
is that the conspiracy theories represent a form of sense-making by the YJC staff. ISIS’s 
success in the region has created a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty, and the 
conspiracy theories are a simple explanation meant to rationalize and relieve that tension. 
Such conspiracy theories always seem plausible and logical in the region, owing to a 
history of Western meddling and conspiracy in the Middle East. However, that 
explanation seems unlikely in messaging that is most probably targeted at English 
language readers in the West instead of an anxious Iranian public.   
It is also possible that the YJC staff might actually believe that linking the United 
States and its regional allies to the rise of ISIS is a conspiracy fact and not merely a 
conspiracy theory. In that case, it makes sense to illuminate this “fact” the Western 
audience. YJC’s content often contains links to content from Iran’s Supreme Leader, 
Ayatollah Khamenei. In fact, the data collected in this study showed that Khamenei is the 
most frequently mentioned Iranian leader in YJC’s posts. Khamenei is often critical of 
the United States and Israel and blames those states for being behind trouble in the 
region.  
For example, one YJC post in June (see Figure 11) included an image from a post 
on the Khamenei.ir Facebook page about recent violence in Iraq. The post was dated June 
14, 2014, but referred to a 2013 statement by Khamenei. It was accompanied by an image 
and caption that summarized a longer statement with the words, “the only one who 
rejoices over these events in Iraq is the Zionist regime and its supporters.”267   




                                                 
 
Figure 11.   Image from YJC post, June 2014268 
Although the statement refers to events from the previous year, reposting it during 
the 2014 ISIS invasion of Iraq shows calculated linkage between ISIS and Israel. The 
Iranian regime might in fact believe in such a linkage; it is also possible that the regime is 
using Israel as a tool to shift blame away from the state. After all, it is more palatable to 
blame Israel and its supporters for the rise of ISIS than it is to place some blame on Iran 
for its support of the Maliki government and its disenfranchisement of the Sunni minority 
in Iraq. Since YJC supports the regime and Khamenei, it follows that their editorial slant 
would also favor the regime. 
Another explanation might be that these conspiracy theories were created at the 
behest of the Iranian government and were meant to serve as wedge-driving rumors 
targeted at a Western audience. Just as with previously mentioned posts that contained 
already popular conspiracy narratives in the West, the effect of rumors about American 
conspiracies in Iraq will likely find some resonance in the United States and the West. 
268  Ibid.  
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Resonance will also likely be found for conspiracy theories that America’s involvement 
in Iraq is based on its thirst for oil, conspiracy theories involving the illuminati and 
conspiracies about an Israeli connection to American politics. 
Evidence that the YJC staff understand this conspiracy theory resonance can be 
found in two posts on their Facebook page from May 2014.269  The posts contain a logo, 
as well as link information to the Conspiracy Club Facebook page,270 which contains a 
link to the Conspiracy Club website.271  The website is in English and the domain is 
registered in Colombia. Its focus is popular conspiracy theories; categories on the website 
include 9/11 conspiracies,272 as well as conspiracies about space aliens.273  There are 
also a number of articles on the website that link to websites that describe the U.S. 
government’s secretive plots against Americans and the world. Examples of these articles 
include a 2001 U.S. plan to invade seven countries, finishing with an invasion of Iran,274 
and an article linking the United States to the AIDS virus that echoes the previously 
discussed Operation INFEKTION.275  The article about the AIDS virus adds a new 
conspiracy layer, crediting Dr. Robert Gallo as the inventor of AIDS (he was, in fact, one 
of the scientists who discovered and identified HIV).276  The fact that YJC is using 
content from the Conspiracy Club website indicates that YJC’s staff has some knowledge 
and familiarity with the Conspiracy Club website’s content and likely its audience. 
269 “YJC.ir - Timeline Photos,” Facebook, accessed January 1, 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/Iran.Club/photos/a.447736721935851.106215.442351522474371/72013285469
6235/?type=1&relevant_count=1. 
270 “Conspiracy Club,” Facebook, accessed January 1, 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/ConspiracyClub. 
271 “The Truth Will Always Win,” Conspiracy Club, accessed January 1, 2015, 
http://www.conspiracyclub.co/. 
272 “9/11,” Conspiracy Club accessed January 1, 2015, 
http://www.conspiracyclub.co/category/conspiracies/911/. 
273 “Aliens and UFOs,” Conspiracy Club, accessed January 1, 2015, 
http://www.conspiracyclub.co/category/conspiracies/aliens-ufos/. 
274 “General Wesley Clark: U.S. Planned Invasion of Seven Countries Back in 2001,” Conspiracy 
Club, accessed January 1, 2015, http://www.conspiracyclub.co/2014/12/29/general-wesley-clark-us-
planned-invasion-7-countries/. 
275 “The Man Who Created Aids : ‘Robert Gallo,’ ” Conspiracy Club, accessed January 1, 2015, 
http://www.conspiracyclub.co/2014/12/08/robert-gallo-aids/. 
276 “The CIA and AIDS - Conspiracy Theories,” Time, accessed January 1, 2015, 
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1860871_1860876_1861031,00.html. 
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Furthermore, it is not clear who is actually running the Conspiracy Club website. To 
complete the analysis of its linkage to YJC’s Facebook page, it would be necessary to 
identify these individuals.    
YJC’s social media efforts on Facebook have not been effective at reaching a 
wide audience. As stated earlier, the data collected for this thesis showed that YJC’s posts 
on Facebook never received beyond double-digit likes and shares. The conspiracy theory 
content is troubling, since it has the potential to produce negative effects on the American 
body politic. However, YJC’s Facebook statistics suggest that the current effect of that 
content is likely negligible. 
C. PRESSTV.COM AND CONSPIRACY THEORIES 
PressTV’s Facebook page contained a higher percentage of conspiracy related 
content, on average, when compared to YJC’s. Around 30 percent of the posts contained, 
or hinted at, conspiracy theories, with a peak of 39 percent in May. Approximately 24 
percent of YJC’s posts featured conspiracy theory content, although that included a high 
of 58 percent during the month of June, when ISIS invaded Iraq.   
However, unlike YJC, PressTV’s content was immersive. The posts contained more 
written content, rather than the simple cartoons favored by YJC. Since the PressTV Facebook 
posts often contained links to the PressTV website, readers who followed those links were 
exposed to even more conspiracy-related content. PressTV often featured poll questions, as 
well as leading questions for the daily show titled “The Debate.” During the period for this 
study, posts featuring conspiracy-related content were amongst the most popular PressTV 
posts. In fact, the only posts that were more popular were posts about the World Cup in 
Brazil or posts related to the worldwide Muslim community’s celebration of Ramadan. A 
more detailed look at some of these posts was included in the previous chapter. 
One of the most significant differences between PressTV and YJC is PressTV’s use 
of analysts and contributors. Many of these analysts are Americans and the selection of 
American analysts is likely not accidental. Americans, and Iranian expatriates living in the 
West, are more likely to trust the words of an American, rather than from an Iranian. At 
first glance, some of these American analysts and contributors appear to have impressive 
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credentials. During the period of this study, Kevin Barrett and Dr. Paul Craig Roberts were 
the most frequent contributors mentioned in PressTV’s Facebook posts. An in-depth look 
at these men and their writings might help to understand their connection to PressTV.     
Kevin Barrett has his own website, Truth Jihad,277 which contains links to his 
content on PressTV and Veterans Today, as well as a lot of material on 9/11 conspiracies. 
The Truth Jihad website receives not much more than 10,000 visitors a month,278 but 
Veterans Today and PressTV give Barrett greater audience reach. Users that visited the 
Truth Jihad site also visited sites such as PressTV.ir and PressTV’s Spanish language 
channel, Hispan.tv.279  Website analytics also show that Truth Jihad is similar to such 
websites as PressTV.ir, Hizbollah.tv and the conspiracy website, 
Whatreallyhappened.com (see Figure 12).280   
.  
Figure 12.  Screen capture taken from Whatreallyhappened.com281 
277 “Truth Jihad,” Truth Jihad, accessed January 2, 2015, http://www.truthjihad.com/. 




281 “The History The U.S. Government Hopes You Never Learn!” What Really Happened, accessed 
February 27, 2015, http://whatreallyhappened.com/#axzz3SvkweiwU. 
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Kevin Barrett is described as an “anti-Semitic conspiracy theorist” by the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL).282  Barrett is a frequent contributor to the Veterans Today 
website (see Figure 13).283  On Veterans Today, Barrett’s biography is more flattering: 
Dr. Kevin Barrett, a Ph.D. Arabist-Islamologist, is one of America’s best-
known critics of the War on Terror. Dr. Barrett has appeared many times 
on Fox, CNN, PBS and other broadcast outlets, and has inspired feature 
stories and op-eds in the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor, 
the Chicago Tribune, and other leading publications. Dr. Barrett has 
taught at colleges and universities in San Francisco, Paris, and Wisconsin, 
where he ran for Congress in 2008. He currently works as a nonprofit 
organizer, author, and talk radio host. 
Despite the seemingly innocuous website name, and a nod to dealing with actual 
veterans’ issues, the Veterans Today website often blames Israel and Jews for their roles 
in various conspiracies: 
But start reading the posts, and you’ll find something else entirely: myriad 
claims that there was a conspiracy behind 9/11 (Israel orchestrated it, in 
cahoots with the American government), that the American government is 
a puppet (of Israel), that the Holocaust never happened or was greatly 
exaggerated (Jews made it up to manipulate non-Jews), and, most 
recently, that Julian Assange, the man behind Wikileaks, is a pawn (of 
Israel)284 
282 “Iran New Horizon Conference Draws U.S. Anti-Semites, Holocaust Deniers,” ADL Blog, October 
2, 2014, http://blog.adl.org/international/iran-new-horizon-conference-draws-u-s-anti-semites-holocaust-
deniers. 
283 “Veterans Administration,” Veterans Today, accessed January 12, 2015, 
http://www.veteranstoday.com/. 
284 Evelyn Schlatter, “Buyer Beware: Veterans Today and Its Anti-Israel Agenda,” Southern Poverty 
Law Center Blog, January 6, 2011, http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2011/01/06/buyer-beware-veterans-
today-and-its-anti-israel-agenda/. 
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Figure 13.   Screen capture taken from Veteranstoday.com285 
A check of website analytics for Veterans Today shows that its top referring sites 
include several websites featuring conspiracy theory content, such as Rense.com (see 
Figure 14), Whatreallyhappened.com and Beforeitsnews.com.286  Rense.com and 
Whatreallyhappened.com were also top referrers to PressTV.287  One of the top 
destination sites for users leaving the Veterans Today website is PressTV.ir.288  Most of 
Veterans Today’s approximately million visitors a month comes from the United States 
and over 70 percent of Veterans Today’s social media traffic comes from Facebook.289   
285 “Veterans Administration,” Veterans Today, accessed January 12, 2015, 
http://www.veteranstoday.com/. 
286 “Veteranstoday.com Traffic Statistics,” SimilarWeb, November 30, 2014, 
http://www.similarweb.com/website/veteranstoday.com. 
287 “Presstv.com Traffic Statistics.” 
288 “Veteranstoday.com Traffic Statistics.” 
289 Ibid. 
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Figure 14.  Screen capture taken from Rense.com290 
Barrett was recently among the invited guests for a 2014 conference in Iran. The 
New Horizon Conference is billed as an International Conference of Independent 
Thinkers and Film Makers. Saeed Jalili, a recent hardline candidate for President in Iran 
and close adviser to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,291 attended the 
conference.292   A personal adviser to the Supreme Leader, Mohsen Ghomi, opened the 
conference.293   Ghomi noted that the conference was “the biggest threat to Zionists,” and 
that “American officials are puppets of the Zionist lobby who are taking advantage of 
American ignorance.”294   Barrett was slated to take part in panels during the conference, 
290 “Rense,” Rense.com, accessed January 12, 2015, http://rense.com/. 
291 Eman El-Shenawi, “The Fear Factor: Iran’s Saeed Jalili Plays on Tension with West - Al Arabiya 
News,” Al Arabiya, June 12, 2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/special-reports/iran-elections-
2013/2013/06/12/The-fear-factor-Iran-s-Saeed-Jalili-plays-on-tension-with-West.html. 
292 “Conference Itinerary,” New Horizon, accessed January 3, 2015, 
http://newhorizon.ir/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=159&Itemid=139. 
293 “Iran New Horizon Conference Draws U.S. Anti-Semites, Holocaust Deniers.” 
294 Ibid. 
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including “Mossad’s Role in the 9/11 Coup d’Etat” and “The Mechanisms of Action of 
the Israeli Lobby and their Effects in Western Capitals.”295     
Kevin Barrett was linked to four of the posts from the data collected for this 
study. The first post came on April 13.296  In that post, relying on Barrett as a source, 
PressTV claimed that a group of rogue elements affiliated with former U.S. President 
George W. Bush were said to be planning new chemical attacks in Syria as part of a false 
flag operation to bring the U.S. military into the Syrian conflict. This post was picked up 
by another popular American conspiracist website, Alex Jones’ Infowars.297  This 
touches on the concept of the “conspiracy entrepreneur” mentioned by Sunstein and 
Vermeule. Alex Jones’ Infowars website currently receives just over 11 million visitors 
per month.298  The Infowars website is loaded with advertising and even has its own 
website store and merchandise. In 2013, it was estimated that Jones’ media empire was 
raking in over $10 million per year.299  The sharing of content by conspiracy websites 
must help those sites to expand their audience and increase the potential impact of their 
message as it reaches even more people. It also likely helps the bottom line for the 
persons behind those websites. It is reasonable to assume that PressTV benefits at the 
very least by the spread of their message to a wider audience; also an audience that tends 
to give some credence to conspiracy theories.   
On May 6, Barrett’s analysis linked the crisis in the Ukraine to an American CIA 
sponsored coup attempt.300   
295 “Conference Itinerary.” 
296 “U.S. Plots New Wave of Chemical Attacks in Syria: Analyst,” PressTV, April 13, 2014, 
http://www.presstv.com/detail/2014/04/13/358415/us-plots-new-chemical-attacks-in-syria/. 
297 “U.S. Plots New Wave of Chemical Attacks in Syria: Analyst Alex Jones’ Infowars: There’s a War 
on for Your Mind!” Infowars.com, April 13, 2014, http://www.infowars.com/us-plots-new-wave-of-
chemical-attacks-in-syria-analyst/. 
298 “Infowars.com Traffic Statistics,” SimilarWeb, December 31, 2014, 
http://www.similarweb.com/website/infowars.com. 
299 Alex Seitz-Wald, “Alex Jones: Conspiracy Inc.,” Salon, May 2, 2013, 
http://www.salon.com/2013/05/02/alex_jones_conspiracy_inc/. 
300 “Ukraine Another CIA Coup Victim: Analyst,” PressTV, May 5, 2014, 
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On May 10, Kevin Barrett penned an article for PressTV titled, “USA insulting 
world’s intelligence.”301  The article contains a heavy dose of conspiracy theories. Barrett 
asserts that the “Ukraine crisis has been a non-stop festival of American lies, each one 
more ridiculous than the last”302 and that “US-NATO lies are failing in Ukraine just as 
they failed in Syria, where President Assad is expected to win re-election on June 3rd and 
preside over an ever-more-united, ever-more-peaceful nation. The turning point in Syria 
was the failure of the al-Ghouta false flag in August, which the U.S. and its Zionist lobby 
unsuccessfully tried to blame on Assad. More recently, another false flag plot by Turkish 
leaders, who were scheming to attack their own country and blame it on Assad, was 
exposed.”303  The article finishes with a resonance building nod to the popular 9/11 
conspiracies by stating that “if they can convince us that 19 debauched pseudo-Muslims 
led by a terminal kidney patient in a cave in Afghanistan could outwit the world’s most 
advanced air defense systems and blow up three buildings with two planes, they have 
good reason to think we are stupid enough to believe almost anything.”304   
On May 17, Barrett wrote another article for PressTV titled, “New study: We’re 
all ‘conspiracy theorists’ now.”305  This is a fascinating article. Barrett essentially claims 
that a psychological study indicated that 97 percent of the persons sampled in the study 
turned out to be 9/11 conspiracy theorists.306  A look at the psychological study shows 
that it was not that straight forward. During the study, 30 persons were asked to 
“construct a plausible story of the events of September 11th 2001, as a single coherent 
story or consisting of coherent or controversial fragments.”307  The participants were 
given cards containing narratives that they would use to form their story. These cards had 





305 Barrett, Kevin, “New Study: We’re All ‘Conspiracy Theorists’ Now,” PressTV, May 17, 2014, 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/05/17/363020/new-study-were-all-conspiracy-theorists-now/. 
306 Marius H. Raab et al., “Thirty Shades of Truth: Conspiracy Theories as Stories of Individuation, 
Not of Pathological Delusion,” Frontiers in Psychology 4 (2013). 
307 Ibid. 
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been put together with input from 38 other persons. The 38 persons were asked to “tell us 
which conspiracy theories they know of; and afterwards asked them to describe their 
favorite theory in detail. Subsequently, we asked ‘which elements are part of most 
conspiracy theories’ as an open question.”308  A deck of 42 cards was created based on 
input from these interviews, only 13 of which contained the canonical account of the 9/11 
attack. The study participants were divided into two groups. The two groups all got the 
13 canonical account cards, but one group was given 16 conspiracy cards and the other 
group got all 42 cards. It is not surprising then that only 5 out of the 30 stories 
constructed by the study participants were considered to match the official account of the 
9/11 attacks. Barrett concluded his analysis by stating, “In short, the study found nothing 
negative - and much that is positive - about ‘conspiracy theories’ and ‘conspiracy 
theorists.’”309  However, the study did in fact note some negative aspects of conspiracy 
theories which contradict Barrett’s statement: 
However, we must not neglect the fact of the harmful potential these 
theories bear. Considering them as an omnipresent and—in principle—
benign psychological phenomenon helps us to explore why some people 
fall for extreme conspiratorial constructs of ideas which might lead to 
xenophobic or even racist arguments. It might also help us to understand 
how agitators deliberately use conspiracy theories to transport hateful 
ideology—wrapped up in a plausible plot that masks these foul intentions 
(Byford and Billig, 2001; Wood and Finlay, 2008). The question should 
not be: Why does one believe a racist conspiracy theory? Rather, we 
should ask: Why does one believe a racist conspiracy theory?310 
The study data pertaining to Barrett indicates that he is indeed focused on 
conspiracy theories and since PressTV features conspiracy content, Barrett is a natural fit. 
Whether or not those conspiracy theories are conspiracy facts is something that I leave 
open to the reader. 
Dr. Paul Craig Roberts has an impressive resume. He is also a contributor to the 
Veterans Today website. His PressTV biography gives testimony to his credentials: 
308 Ibid. 
309 Barrett, “New Study: We’re All ‘Conspiracy Theorists’ Now.” 
310 Raab et al., “Thirty Shades of Truth.” 
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Dr Paul Craig Roberts was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for 
Economic Policy and associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. He was 
columnist for Business Week, Scripps Howard News Service, and 
Creators Syndicate. He has had many university appointments. His 
Internet columns have attracted a worldwide following. His latest book, 
‘The Failure of Laissez Faire Capitalism and Economic Dissolution of the 
West’ is now available.311 
Paul Craig Roberts has a website that contains a great deal of content critical of 
American foreign and domestic policy.312  Roberts’ website averages around 500,000 
visits a month.313  Top referrers to Roberts’ website come from such sites as the 
conspiracy-oriented Whatreallyhappened.com and Rense.com, as well as a website that 
contains an apology letter to Vladimir Putin and the Russian people for the behavior of 
Western governments.314   
Roberts’ contributions to PressTV have some similarities to Barrett’s, in that they 
contain conspiracy theories, but their focus during the period of this study was focused on 
the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and the West. In an article from April 9, Roberts 
writes about a CIA plot to use the book Dr. Zhivago against the Soviet Union. In that 
article Roberts makes some interesting assertions: 
Tell that to the National Stasi Agency and to Homeland Security and to 
the detainees in Guantanamo and the CIA’s torture prisons. In the U.S. 
individual privacy no longer exists. The NSA collects and stores every 
email, every credit card purchase, every telephone conversation, every 
Internet search, every use of social media of every citizen. Pasternak had 
far more privacy than any American has today. ... Today Russian citizens 
are more free to have private lives than are Americans, and the Russian 
press is more lively and more critical of government than the American 
press. As I wrote in one of my columns, when communist East Germany 
dissolved, the Stasi moved to Washington. 
311 Paul Craig Roberts, “Press TV,” PressTV, April 9, 2014, 
http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/357846.html. 





                                                 
Roberts brought up some important controversial issues with his mentions of 
Guantanamo, CIA torture prisons and NSA intrusions on the privacy of American 
citizens. However, his point that the Russian press and citizens have more freedom than 
their American counterparts would seem to stretch credulity. 
In an April 27 post, Roberts wrote, “The Obama regime, wallowing in hubris and 
arrogance, has recklessly escalated the Ukrainian crisis into a crisis with Russia.”  He 
also added, “In other words, Washington’s demand is that Russia put Humpty Dumpty 
back together again and hand him over to Washington … The ignorant Western media 
and Washington’s European puppet states are supporting this unrealistic demand. 
Consequently, Russian leaders have lost all confidence in the word and intentions of the 
West, and this is how wars start…European politicians are putting their countries at great 
peril and for what gain? Are Europe’s politicians blackmailed, threatened, paid off with 
bags of money, or are they so accustomed to following Washington’s lead that they are 
unable to do anything else? How do Germany, the UK, and France benefit from being 
forced into a confrontation with Russia by Washington?...”315  Roberts’ account of events 
in the Ukraine would seem to lack balance, placing no blame at all for the escalation of 
violence in the Ukraine on Russia. Instead, we have a suggestion that the United States is 
running European politics with secretive schemes involving bribery, blackmail or threats.   
On June 10, Roberts wrote another article discussing World War II. The article is 
similar to the one from April 27, in that Roberts defends the Russian point of view about 
that war, and other issues, over the point of view of the United States and its European 
allies.316  Also, similar to the previous article, Roberts wrote “How is it possible that by 
now Europe doesn’t understand how Washington thinks? Those bags full of money must 
be very large. As I have reported several times, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security affairs told me years ago that Washington purchases European 
politicians with bags full of money. It remains to be seen if European ‘leaders’ are willing 
to sacrifice their peoples and their own reputations in order to be complicit in the war that 
315 Paul Craig Roberts, “U.S. ‘Moving World Closer to War,’” PressTV, April 27, 2014, 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/04/27/360255/us-moving-world-closer-to-war/. 
316 Paul Craig Roberts, “World War II: The Unknown War,” PressTV, June 10, 2014, 
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/06/10/366365/world-war-ii-the-unknown-war/. 
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Washington is planning with Russia, a war that could mean the end of life on earth.”317  
This kind of statement is difficult to refute, or prove, but as with the similar statement in 
the April 27 post, it would constitute what Robert Knapp would have classified as a 
wedge-driving rumor targeted at splitting the ties between the United States and its 
European allies.318   
In a June 18 article, Roberts wrote, “Washington is demonizing Russia and 
Russia’s President with shameless lies and propaganda, thus preparing the populations of 
the U.S. and its client states for war with Russia.”319  He also wrote, “The destruction of 
seven countries in whole or in part by the West in the 21st century, with the support of 
‘Western civilization’ and the Western media, comprises powerful evidence that the 
leadership of the Western world is devoid of moral conscience and human compassion. 
Now that Washington is armed with its false doctrine of ‘nuclear primacy,’ the outlook 
for humanity is very bleak.”320  Roberts also made a reference to a popular target of the 
conspiracy theorist, the military industrial complex, when he wrote, “It is possible to see 
these calls for more military spending as just the normal functioning of agents for the 
U.S. military/security complex. Having lost ‘the war on terror’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Washington needs a replacement and has set about resurrecting the Cold War.”321  
Roberts added to the list of possible conspirators when he wrote, “Since last autumn, the 
U.S. government has been lying through its teeth about Ukraine, blaming Russia for the 
consequences of Washington’s actions, and demonizing Putin. The presstitute media and 
the European capitals have seconded the lies and propaganda and repeat them endlessly. 
Consequently, the U.S. public’s attitude toward Russia moved sharply negative.”322  Not 
surprisingly, Roberts does not find any fault with Russia in the Ukrainian crisis. Roberts 
wrote, “So far the Russians (and the Chinese) have remained sensible. Lavrov, the 
317 Ibid. 
318 Knapp, “A Psychology of Rumor.” 






                                                 
Foreign Minister said: ‘At this stage, we want to give our partners a chance to calm 
down. We’ll see what happens next. If absolutely baseless accusations against Russia 
continue, it there are attempts to pressure us with economic leverage, then we may 
reevaluate the situation.’ ”323   
Based on the data collected for this thesis, Roberts’ articles posted by PressTV are 
supportive of Russia and critical of America and its Western allies. Conspiracy theories 
and wedge-driving rumors are included in these articles.   
It would seem logical that PressTV, as with any media outlet, would choose 
analysts and contributors supportive of their editorial views. Paul Craig Roberts and 
Kevin Barrett are critical of the United States and its allies, including Israel, but they are 
also supportive of some of America’s rivals: Russia and Syria. The data collected for this 
thesis shows that PressTV views things the same way. Barrett, and to a lesser extent, 
Roberts include conspiracy theories in their articles and this is also something they have 
in common with PressTV. Finally, it is significant that the articles and websites for 
analysts and contributors such as Roberts and Barrett are often connected to other popular 
English language conspiracy websites on the Internet. These connections virtually ensure 
higher volumes of Internet traffic and connections to PressTV’s English language 
content.   
Without further evidence, it would not be possible to prove whether or not 
PressTV’s staff actually factors in connections to the conspiracy theory community on 
the Internet when they select their analysts and contributors. As indicated above, it might 
simply be that these analysts and contributors are in agreement with PressTV’s staff on 
the issues. The invitation of Barrett to the conference in Iran does provide a clue though. 
When influential Americans and other Western citizens appear at an Iranian conference 
with an agenda linked to the Iranian government’s narrative, it likely serves to bolster 
Iran’s regime in the minds of their own people, as well as in the minds of persons living 




                                                 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A. THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
Today we live in the information age. The Internet has created a paradigm shift in 
the way people communicate throughout the world. Nation states and mass media outlets 
still hold a great deal of messaging power, but the Internet has altered the equation by 
allowing virtually anyone, or any group, to have largely unfettered access to any 
population on the globe. All that is necessary is Internet connectivity and a message. In 
some states, censorship and firewalls complicate matters, but the messenger and the 
curious listener or reader still always seem to find a way to connect. Social media 
provides a powerful messaging tool for global outreach. 
Iranian media outlets have taken advantage of social media and are actively using 
the tool to put out their message. Since the research for this thesis was conducted in an 
effort to learn about the significance behind Iran’s message in the context of American 
security, this study focused only on the Iranian social media messages in English. Time 
constraints and a lack of foreign language skills also precluded any effort to analyze 
Iran’s social media messaging in other languages. 
An analyst can’t truly know what is in the minds of the creators of Iran’s social 
media message, but an analyst can find clues about the Iranian mindset and messaging 
strategy contained within their posts. In this thesis, I used a qualitative analysis of Iranian 
social media posts in an effort to find those clues. Since I was the sole collector and coder 
of the data for qualitative analysis, it was inevitable that some amount of bias will have 
crept into the process. 
B. THEMES IN THE IRANIAN MESSAGE 
When viewing the collected data in its entirety, some broad themes emerge. First 
of all, the tone of the message is overwhelmingly negative. This should not be surprising 
to Americans who have watched election campaign commercials or tuned their 
televisions to the nightly news broadcast. The human mind gives more weight to negative 
information, so going negative is an effective messaging technique.   
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The predominant theme that was evident in the Iranian message was that they are 
critical of the current world order, a world order seen as being orchestrated by the United 
States and often influenced by the Zionists. According to Ayatollah Khamenei and the 
Iranian social media outlets, Iran is in the camp of nations that do not obey the United 
States and Iranian social media messaging supports the other members of that camp, 
including Russia, China, Venezuela, and Syria. Special attention was given to the plight 
of Palestinians against Israel. The Iranian message portrayed the world outside of Iran as 
violent, unstable, unjust, and in a state of chaos. The Iranian regime benefits from this 
message because it can claim to be protecting its people from the hostile world just 
outside its borders. The United States and its allies were seen as interfering with and 
bullying other countries through military moves, media propaganda, punishing economic 
sanctions, and conspiratorial acts hidden from public view.   Iran was not the only target. 
Russia, Syria, Iraq, the Palestinians and even some groups of Americans were also 
portrayed as victims.   
The Iranian message also attempted to convey that Muslims were under 
worldwide attack through destabilization efforts of Western media, or by “Muslim 
cleansing” in Myanmar, Central African Republic, Sri Lanka and India. Additionally, the 
message was that America and its allies, including Sunni Arab nations such as Saudi 
Arabia, were covertly supporting the violent efforts of “takfiri” Muslims in Syria, Nigeria 
and elsewhere. Khamenei’s message on this was that the “arrogant powers are fomenting 
conflict among Muslims in a bid to cover up their own problems…propagating Irano-
phobia and Shia-phobia to protect Israel.”324  Of course, these themes are really no 
surprise to even the most casual observer of news from Iran. Iran’s messaging strategy is 
clearly shaped by its Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. If an analyst wants to 
understand the overarching strategy driving Iran’s messaging to any segment of the 
outside world, he only really needs to study the speeches, writings, and statements issued 
by Khamenei. Since the Iranian regime is a theocracy and Khamenei is the ultimate 
authority in matters of policy, the statements from other key politicians and state-




                                                 
controlled media outlets are going to follow Khamenei’s lead. Therefore, when studying 
Iranian social media, the analyst will probably find greater reward focusing less on what 
the Iranian media outlets say but rather on how they say it.    
C. THE CRAFTING OF IRAN’S SOCIAL MEDIA MESSAGE 
From analysis of the Iranian social media content, it is possible to come to some 
conclusion about the structure and design of the Iranian social media message 
campaign:325 
• The purposes of the campaign are to legitimize the Iranian regime, be 
critical of the current world order and to foster alternative ways of 
thinking. 
• The message creators are cognizant of world events and weave their 
message against that backdrop.   
• YJC and PressTV both, of necessity, back the hardline stance of 
Khamenei’s regime. YJC’s staff seems to be in the more extreme camp, 
closer to Khamenei and the hardliners, as evidenced by their inclusion of 
often insulting images, incendiary rhetoric and frequent linking to content 
from Khamenei.ir. PressTV’s efforts were more subtle. 
• The target audience of the campaign is varied. Since English is the 
language used in the social media content being analyzed, it is likely that 
the content is largely directed at Americans and others, including Iranians, 
living in the West. Further support for this can be found in PressTV’s 
inclusion of content provided by American analysts and contributors. 
Using social media for messaging would suggest that Iranian media outlets 
are targeting the younger demographic.326  Perhaps this is a conscious 
choice since younger people are often seen as more accepting of new and 
alternative views. Support for the proposition that Iran’s social media 
message is targeted at the youth can be found in PressTV’s embrace of 
new media outlets. As youth are shifting away from Facebook to 
alternative sites like Tumblr327 and messaging applications like 
325 Jowett and O’Donnell, “How to Analyze Propaganda.” 
326 Brenner, “Social Networking.” 
327 Ryan W. Neal, “Facebook Gets Older: Demographic Report Shows 3 Million Teens Left Social 
Network in 3 Years,” International Business Times, January 16, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/facebook-
gets-older-demographic-report-shows-3-million-teens-left-social-network-3-years-1543092. 
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WhatsApp,328 PressTV has established a presence on those sites as well. 
PressTV’s use of terms such as “takfiri,” and their focus on the Middle 
East, as well as on Muslim issues and celebrations, indicates that Muslims 
living in the West are another specific target audience. PressTV and YJC 
included posts that sought to encourage and identify with alternative 
thinkers. Those posts often contained conspiracy theories. Additional 
evidence of this was found in PressTV’s selection of analysts and 
contributors who have websites that contain, and further link to additional 
websites that contain, conspiracy theory content. PressTV’s social media 
posts also frequently contained links to their own website where readers 
would find polls, questions and related articles and viewpoints that 
suggested conspiracy theories. 
• YJC and PressTV took very different approaches with their respective 
social media channels. YJC’s content consisted mostly of images and 
scant written content. YJC did not seem to make a concerted effort to 
drive social media users to the YJC website. PressTV’s approach was far 
more developed. Its content was rich in written word, as well as in visuals. 
The content was also interactive, including polls and questions (often 
leading questions) to engage the reader. PressTV’s posts frequently 
contained links to their website. Once a social media reader arrived at the 
PressTV website, they were treated to an immersive, multi-faceted media 
experience. The viewer could read, look at images, watch and listen to 
video reports and interact by participating in polls and leaving and reading 
comments. The website’s appearance was crafted to look very similar to 
other popular Western news outlets. PressTV was rewarded by a positive 
audience reaction. Compared to YJC, PressTV received a far greater 
number of likes, shares and comments on their Facebook posts. PressTV 
was clearly more effective than YJC in its social media efforts. 
• Iranian social media outlets made good use of special techniques when 
communicating with their audience.   For example, the use of language 
and imagery evoking strong emotions was likely calculated to enhance the 
effect of their messages. PressTV used visual symbols to enhance their 
image and credibility. Examples of this include the PressTV logo and the 
use of a newsroom setting and camera styles similar to those of their 
counterparts in the West. Both PressTV and YJC understood the current 
hot topics circulating in Western media and capitalized on those to 
establish resonance with their audience. The use of content critical of the 
American National Security Agency (NSA) at a time when Snowden’s 
328 Ryan W. Neal, “WhatsApp, SnapChat And LINE: Why Mobile Messaging Apps Are Taking 




                                                 
revelations were damaging that institution’s reputation in the United States 
was an example of this tactic.    
Both PressTV and YJC are heavily involved in using social media to get their 
message out to the West, but audience reaction shows that PressTV is more effective in 
their use of the medium. 
D. RUMORS AND CONSPIRACY THEORIES 
Both YJC and PressTV’s social media posts contain conspiracy theory content. 
PressTV’s choice of analysts and contributors reflected a greater degree of commitment 
to that content and PressTV benefits from increased website traffic from conspiracy 
websites as a result. When Western analysts and contributors can be shown to agree with 
the Iranian regime, then the regime’s reputation and credibility is enhanced to some 
degree. The connection to conspiracy websites might simply be an effort to tap into an 
audience predisposed to Iran’s message that is critical of the current world order. 
However, there are other plausible explanations, such as the possibility that the Iranian 
regime and Iranian media see conspiracy theories as conspiracy facts and they have found 
a like-minded audience in the West. Another explanation might be that these conspiracy 
theories were created at the behest of the Iranian government and are meant to serve as 
wedge-driving rumors targeted at a Western audience. It is also possible that the regime 
might be using conspiracy theories to deflect criticism for poor conditions at home and in 
the region away from the Iranian government by placing the blame on the conspiracies of 
the West, and, of course, Israel. 
E. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Iran’s social media message has only achieved modest inroads. Using Facebook 
likes, comments and shares as a metric, YJC has failed miserably, but PressTV has had 
moderate success. PressTV’s metrics have likely been enhanced by their connection to 
the Internet’s conspiracy theory community. However, website statistics indicate that 
PressTV329 is not much more successful than some of the conspiracy websites, such as 
329 “Presstv.ir [Analysis],” MuStat, accessed January 13, 2015, http://www.mustat.com/presstv.ir. 
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Veterans Today330 and they have a long way to go to match up to leaders in that genre, 
such as Alex Jones’ Infowars.331  PressTV has even more ground to make up against its 
peers in the Western news world, such as CNN332 or BBC.333  The Iranian government 
exerts a great deal of control on Iranian media outlets and on the Internet in Iran. 
Censorship of the Internet is not prevalent in the United States. Iranian social media 
channels can reach our citizens at will, but censorship in Iran makes any messages going 
the other way difficult to get out. Of course, that censorship only serves to degrade their 
credibility in other regions of the world. The Iranian messaging campaign is also 
hamstrung by its need for adherence to the message of the regime’s leadership. Efforts to 
branch out to pull in groups who don’t agree or identify with that message must be 
challenging indeed. In fact, this might be the reason that the Iranian Student’s News 
Agency’s (ISNA) Facebook page was virtually bereft of any posts during the study 
period of this thesis. Since ISNA’s message is a moderate one, it is quite possible that the 
regime is censoring its Facebook page.    
1. Recruitment and Radicalization 
In the data evaluated for this thesis, there was no evidence found pointing towards 
any Iranian social media effort to recruit or radicalize Americans to commit violent acts 
against the United States government. However, there is a potential for Iranian 
intelligence operatives to use the interaction by Americans with Iranian social media 
messages as a guide for identifying possible candidates for recruitment to commit 
espionage against the United States.   
2. Conspiracy Theories and Rumors 
Branding a statement as conspiracy theory or an individual a conspiracy theorist is 
not necessarily a pejorative term. Some conspiracy theories turn out to be conspiracy fact, 
330 “Veteranstoday.com [Analysis],” MuStat, accessed January 13, 2015, 
http://www.mustat.com/veteranstoday.com. 
331 “Infowars.com [Analysis],” MuStat, accessed January 13, 2015, 
http://www.mustat.com/infowars.com. 
332 “Cnn.com [Analysis],” MuStat, accessed January 13, 2015, http://www.mustat.com/cnn.com. 
333 “BBC.co.uk [Analysis],” MuStat, accessed January 13, 2015, http://www.mustat.com/bbc.co.uk. 
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or are at least found to contain a “kernel of truth.”  And when people are anxious or are 
faced with uncertainty, conspiracies and rumors might be seen as a sort of coping 
mechanism. Nevertheless, conspiracy theories and rumors have the potential to do 
damage to a society. Psychological studies indicate that conspiracy theories increase 
distrust in the government and have a negative effect on a person’s likelihood to vote in 
the future. Conspiracy theories and rumors can also be used in disinformation campaigns 
that can tarnish the image of a nation worldwide. The former Soviet Union’s 
OPERATION INFEKTION was an example of a successful disinformation campaign 
that took advantage of the psychology of rumor and conspiracy theories. Studies have 
also linked rumors, which are often used as a means to spread conspiracy theories, to 
civil unrest. The recent protests in Ferguson, Missouri, some of which were violent, took 
place in an environment fueled in part by rumors. Long before the official account of the 
Michael Brown shooting was released, rumors that Brown had his hands up when he was 
shot were circulated and became part of the rallying cry of the protesters. Even when 
autopsy evidence and conflicting eyewitness reports emerged and challenged the veracity 
of the rumor, the original rumor persisted. It is the creation and manipulation of 
incendiary events such as this that could provide weapons for America’s enemies, foreign 
and domestic, to tear away at the fabric of our democracy. One positive aspect of 
conspiracy theories and rumors is that it is possible for an Internet analyst to follow and 
track their creation and spread in an effort to identify areas of weakness in government 
messaging, to get ahead of potentially damaging rumors and conspiracies, and to inform 
persons who will be crafting counter-messaging strategies. 
3. Recommendations 
The Iranian regime’s social media message has not been terribly effective, but it 
does possess some modest potential to do mischief by tapping into the conspiracy theory 
community or through the use of disinformation campaigns. The Iranian message is 
hampered by its own censorship efforts. Engagement on social media with counter-
messaging emphasizing the fact that Iranian citizens can’t freely access the same social 
media channels that they are using to put out their message to the West would likely be 
effective. Counter-messaging could also be crafted pointing out how Iran deals with 
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dissenting views in its own country. Finally, advances in technology could be leveraged 
to defeat Iran’s censorship of the Internet and all Iranians would then have unfettered 
access to Western media sources. Perhaps the deployment of Google’s proposed low-
orbit satellite network for Internet access might be one tool that could help Iranians 
navigate around the censors.334   
Internet rumors and conspiracy theories represent a danger to the American 
democracy. Analysts can assist our leaders by identifying and tracking potentially 
damaging rumors and conspiracy theories. Based on those efforts, it should be possible to 
craft counter-messaging strategies. Some of these counter-messaging strategies might 
consist of nothing more than efforts at greater government transparency and recognizing 
the need to put out information and facts to fill the void that generates rumors and 
conspiracy theories in the first place. Also, using Rosnow’s analogy of the spreading of 
rumors being similar to firing a gun, improving the critical thinking skills of the 
American public and educating the public about the psychology of rumors and conspiracy 
theories might keep the public from “loading the gun” to begin with.335   
F. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis identified delved into some interesting cultural differences between 
Iran and the Western world, particularly when looking at conspiracy theories. Additional 
research should be focused on other cultural differences if Americans ever really want to 
understand how Iranians think. Perhaps through greater understanding we might be able 
to improve relations between our two countries. 
Further studies of Iranian social media messaging in languages other than English 
might provide some valuable insights into how Iran tailors their message to different 
world communities, but owing to the structure of Iran’s governmental system it might not 
provide much insight into Iran’s actual overarching message strategy that could not 
already be gleaned from the statements of Ayatollah Khamenei.   
334 Jon Brodkin, “Google to Deploy 180 Low-Orbit Satellites That Provide Internet Access,” Ars 
Technica, June 2, 2014, http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/06/google-to-deploy-180-low-
orbit-satellites-that-provide-Internet-access/. 
335 Rosnow, “Inside Rumor: A Personal Journey.” 
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Studies of the social media efforts of other nations might also be conducted. Some 
significant understanding might be achieved through the comparison and contrasting of 
these studies. 
The study of rumors and conspiracy theories and their effect on society deserves 
further exploration. Identifying individual rumors and conspiracy theories and tracking 
their creation, spread and effect on the social media community might be useful in that 
regard. Studies on the inclusion of rumors and conspiracy theories by media sources from 
nations other than Iran might also lead to valuable insights.        
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